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This thesis examines strategic motivations and implications of the international
expansion ofChina's maritime shipping industry (MSI). China's economic growth strategy
depends upon maritime shipping to export foreign exchange earning commodities and import
energy, industrial, and food resources. As a result, China's MSI is expanding faster than that
of any other nation in the world. China's MSI expansion is creating regional shipping
networks that increase levels of Sino-foreign trade (SFT) interdependence. The argument
herein is that increases in SFT enhance Beijing's regional ability to advance China's
economic, political and security interests.
The analysis suggests China's foreign policy and overseas investment in strategic
resources increase levels ofSFT and transportation requirements for China's MSI. China's
MSI expansion impacts regional shipping services, schedules, and prices in China's favor.
The analysis also suggests China's dependencies on regional MSI and SFT networks
increases Beijing's sense of maritime economic vulnerability to perceived threats in
international waters. China's maritime security policy and recent naval deployments are
examined to assess the potential for China's Navy to protect China's MSI in regions where
levels of SFT are high. China's desire to protect its MSI offers opportunities for Sino-U.S.
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This thesis identifies strategic economic and security implications posed by the
international expansion of China's maritime shipping industry (MSI). China's robust
economic growth strategy depends upon maritime shipping to export foreign exchange
earning goods and import strategic energy, industrial, and food resources. This strategy's
success depends upon expanding the international operations of China's MSI and Sino-
foreign trade (SFT). This thesis posits that increases in bilateral MSI cooperation and SFT
enhance China's opportunities for advancing China's economic and security interests.
China's foreign policy and overseas investment in foreign resources increase the
transportation requirements for China's MSI and levels of SFT. Elements of China's MSI
examined are China's merchant marine fleet (MMF), port infrastructure, international
shipping operations, and foreign port development and access. Elements of SFT examined
are China's import and export trade dependencies in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
South America.
The analysis suggests that there are three primary motivations for China's MSI
expansion. One motivation is the result of deficiencies in strategic resources caused by
China's rapid economic expansion and relative imbalances between increasing consumption
and decreasing production. Therefore, China's MSI must expand to import larger volumes
of strategic resources for satisfying domestic industrial and consumer demand.
Another motivation is pure profit. China's state-owned MSI earns foreign exchange
by transporting containerized and bulk cargo and building merchant ships for other nations.
Still another motivation is China's export-led economic growth strategy which depends on
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increasing international market share. As a result, China's MSI is expanding its handling
capacity and international trade linkages for transporting larger volumes of China's
domestically-produced export goods.
Economic implications are identified from the expansion ofChina's MMF's regional
trades, cargo handling capacity, and foreign port access. China's MSI aggressively
underbids rival competitors to gain market share ofcontainerized trades. The analysis shows
China's MSI expansion increases the volume and value of trades linked to China in the
Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea regions.
Security implications are identified from China's growing economic dependency on
regional MSI and SFT networks. Between 40-50 percent of China's economy depends on
SFT for sustained growth. Between 85-95 percent of SFT is transported by maritime
shipping. Beijing perceives these networks are vulnerable to potential threats from foreign
navies, piracy, terrorism and regional conflicts near littoral areas. China's economy would
be disrupted if access to secure and reliable flows of resources are denied.
The analysis suggests that Beijing's perceptions ofthese vulnerabilities increase the
likelihood that Beijing will commit the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) to
maintaining at least an occasional presence for protecting maritime shipping beyond China's
territorial waters. However, while the U.S. Navy (USN) maintains a robust naval presence
to ensure international maritime economic stability, the substandard capabilities ofPLAN
combatants have precluded it from protecting China's MMF beyond territorial waters. This
thesis posits that China will use its economic dependence on maritime shipping as a primary
rationale for the PLAN maintaining an occasional presence in international waters.
xvi
An occasional presence would not necessarily threaten foreign commercial or naval
shipping. The PLAN'S success in deploying long distances would be enhanced through
access to foreign ports for repair, refueling, and replenishment. The PLAN is most likely to
have access to foreign ports where levels of SFT and bilateral MSI cooperation are high.
During a 14-month period, between March 1997-May 1998, a total of nine PLAN ships
visited ports in nine foreign nations on four continents and sailed over 40,000 nautical miles
(NM) within the Asia-Pacific region. Cumulatively, this activity represents the farthest
distance sailed and time spent in international waters ever undertaken by the PLAN.
The strengths ofChina's MSI, plus its perceived vulnerability, could cause the PLAN
to increase its international presence and be depicted as dangerous to the maritime security
ofthe United States. However, China's desire to protect its MSI represents opportunities for
USN-PLAN cooperation. By using protection of maritime shipping, as a basis for joint and
combined exercises, the political and security stigmas of exercises based on power
projection, sea denial, or territorial seizure are removed. In 1998, the United States and
China signed a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement which provides a forum and a
basis for the U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) to initiate bilateral naval cooperation.
In conclusion, China's MSI provides Beijing with a means to exert its influence over
regional maritime transportation networks linking China with foreign suppliers of energy,
industrial, and food resources. How China uses its economic, political, and security
influence within the international maritime economy is relevant for U.S. foreign policy,
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As economics expand globally, there are corresponding increases in reliance on shipping
lanes and vulnerability from sea-lane choke points. Expanding commercial ties and market
competition will increasingly affect our relationships within and without the region.
Increasing regional energy demands, particularly in India, China, and Japan, will stress global
energy supplies.
Admiral Prueher, Testimony Before the House National Security Committee, 1997
As a multipolar world structure gradually comes into being, there will be contradictions of
economic interests among multiple centers . . . Geoeconomics will dominate geopolitics.
War is the contradiction of politics, and more directly the contradiction of economics.
Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Military Theory and Conflict, 1994
A. BACKGROUND
China's maritime shipping industry (MSI) is expanding more than that of any other
nation. China's economic development strategy depends upon foreign trade for growth and
stability. This strategy's success, measured by increases in exports and imports between
China and foreign nations, results in additional transportation requirements for China's MSI.
China's MSI expansion is creating regional shipping networks that increase levels of
Sino-foreign trade (SFT). China's dependence upon these networks increases its sense of
vulnerability to potential threats in international waters. As a result, China is motivated to
deploy China's Navy to protect its maritime shipping interests. This behavior could be
depicted as dangerous to U.S. interests. Instead, it represents opportunities for Sino-U.S.
naval cooperation in protecting mutual maritime shipping interests in international waters.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategic economic and security implications
posed by the international expansion of China's MSI operations in developing regions.
Economic implications are derived from an analysis of China's emphasis on expanding the
regional influence of its state-owned MSI as the foundation for China's economic
development strategy. Security implications are identified through analysis of Beijing's
perceptions of China's strategic maritime economic vulnerabilities attributable to
dependencies on regional MSI and SFT networks.
This analysis of China's MSI expansion provides insight into Beijing's behavior in
international economic, political, and security affairs. This is illustrated in China as a
Maritime Power, by David G. Muller, who stated: "To understand Chinese strategy,
economics, and foreign policy in the years ahead, it will be necessary to understand the new
maritime elements ofChina's national interests and national power." 1 Edward N. Luttwak's
explanation ofthe international economy and state behavior shows the relevance ofmaritime
economics and China's MSI expansion for U.S. national security and foreign policy in his
article "The Coming Global War for Economic Power:"
Geo-economics is spreading and becoming the dominant phenomenon in the
central arena of world affairs. States will tend to act geo-economically . . .
to outdo each other on the world scene. The corresponding geo-economic
goal is . . . conquest or protection of desirable roles in the world economy.
The winners will have those highly rewarding and controlling roles. 2
This thesis identifies China's MSI expansion as a linchpin in Chinese economic
'David G. Muller, China As a Maritime Power, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 1.
2Edward N. Luttwak, "The Coming Global War for Economic Power," The International Economy,
September-October 1993, 18-20.
development strategy. China's robust economy is characterized by relative gaps between
levels of increasing consumption and decreasing production of strategic resources.
Therefore, China's dependence upon imported energy, industrial, and food resources from
foreign nations is growing. This thesis shows how and where these dependencies result in
additional transportation requirements for China's MSI.
The economic implications of China's MSI expansion are increases in China's:
1
.
International influence over foreign trade and strategic resources.
2. Market share of maritime shipping services, routes, and rates.
3 Commercial access to foreign commercial ports.
The security implications are China's perceptions that:
1 China's MSI and SFT networks are vulnerable.
2. China's Navy may deploy in international waters to protect these networks.
3. China's MSI vulnerabilities could serve as a rationale for Chinese naval access to
foreign ports and bilateral cooperation with foreign navies to protect mutual MSI interests.
C. METHODOLOGY
This thesis derives motivations for and implications ofChina's MSI expansion from
an examination of regional relationships between China's MSI expansion and SFT with
developing nations. The elements of China's MSI examined are China's merchant marine
fleet (MMF), port infrastructure, international shipping operations, and foreign port
development and access. The elements of SFT examined are China's import and export
trade dependencies in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America.
The major research questions this thesis seeks to answer are:
1.
Why is China expanding its MSI?
2. How does China's foreign policy encourage China's MSI expansion?
3. How does China's MSI expansion affect SFT, the international MSI, and Chinese
access to foreign strategic resources?
4. How does China's MSI expansion influence Beijing's perceptions of China's
strategic maritime economic vulnerabilities, maritime security policy, and China's Navy?
This thesis posits that China's MSI expansion strategy increases levels of SFT in
developing regions. More specifically, the dependent variable is the level of China's MSI
presence in developing regions. Independent variables are:
1
.
Size and cargo handling capability of China's MMF.
2. Levels of Sino-foreign shipping alliances, port development, and access.
3. Level of China's foreign investment in foreign strategic resources.
4. Success of China's foreign policy in increasing levels of SFT.
5. China's economic dependence on importing resources and exporting goods.
In conclusion, the relevance of this thesis for U.S. national security is that it helps
explain China's behavior as a growing world power and rival competitor in an increasingly
interdependent world economy. This thesis asserts that China's MSI expansion increases
China's economic competitiveness and influence in developing regions.
II. CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE EXPANSION STRATEGY
Economics are playing an increasingly important role in the current international relations.
Experience indicates that only through closer unity and cooperation . . . can developing
countries effectively resist hegemonism and outside interference.
President Jiang Zemin, Speech Before the Pakistani Senate, 1996
Economic factors are more prominent in international relations. We should work to maintain
steady growth in foreign trade Energetically develop multilateral and bilateral trade and
economic relations with other countries ....
Premier Li Peng, Report to China 's National People 's Congress, 1995
The size and growth rate of a nation's economy are primary factors determining its
level of dependence on maritime shipping and foreign trade. China's economy has grown
by nearly 10 percent annually during the past 20 years. 3 In 1997, China's gross domestic
product (GDP) exceeded $3 trillion and ranking it the world's second largest economy after
the United States.4 In 1998, Beijing set an annual economic growth rate goal of seven
percent which would double the level of China's GDP5 to $1 1 trillion by 20 10.6
China's domestic economic development strategy depends on its MSI and SFT for
its sustainment and expansion. China's MSI expansion is necessary to increases levels of
SFT to secure foreign resources and markets for China's exports. This strategy is creating
an international SFT network where China is the "hub" and foreign nations are the "spokes."
3Compared to the world average economic growth rate of four percent. Zuliu Hu and Mohsin S. Khan,
Why Is China Growing So Fast? (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, April 1997), 1.
"According to World Bank purchasing power parity estimates for 1994, cited in Samuel S. Kim,
"China as a Great Power," Current History, September 1997, 247.
5Wu Yi, "Prospects for China's foreign Economic and Trade Development," Beijing Review, 17
February - 3 March 1997, 21.
6Compared to similar GDP estimates of $10.7 trillion for the United States, $4.5 trillion for Japan, and
$1.3 trillion for India. Kim, 247.
This expansion is also creating regional SFT networks where China's MSI is gaining
economic influence for China through bilateral shipping alliances and foreign port access.
A. MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF SINO-FOREIGN TRADE
China's dependence on foreign trade has increased significantly as a percentage of
its gross national product (GNP). Between 1978-1995, China's dependence on SFT
increased from $21 billion, or 10 percent of GNP, to $280 billion, or 56 percent of GNP. 7
During this same period, China's share ofthe world's international trade increased from 0.75





Between 1991-1995, the value of SFT exceeded $1 trillion and grew by 20 percent. 9
In 1996, the value of SFT was $289.9 billion, a 3.2 percent increase over 1995. 10 In 1997,
the value ofSFT trade was $325 billion, a 1 2. 1 percent increase over 1 996 and ranking China
the world's 10th largest trading nation with nearly four percent of the world's total trade. 11
For 1998, SFT is estimated to increase by 12.5 percent to reach $365 billion 12 and by 2000
to $400 billion. 13
7Level of dependence is defined as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GNP. Ibid. By
comparison, in 1995 the value of foreign trade for the United States totaled over $1.3 trillion, or 27 percent
of U.S. GNP, U.S. Department of Commerce statistics cited in Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997,
(Suitland: Office of Naval Intelligence, March 1997), 3.
8
Yi, 15.
'"China's Shipping Prospects," Cargonews China, 1 May 1997. Online. Available
HTTP:http://web3.asial.com.sg/timesnet/data/cnc/docs/cnc0287.html, 15 June 1997.
10PRC Embassy (Washington)"Foreign Economic Relations and Trade," Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.china-embassy.org/cgi-bin/press.pl?Im-exp. 17 April 1998. U.S. foreign trade in 1996
totaled $1 .4 trillion, cited in James D. Hessman and Marcia Smith, "Filling the Critical Need For Sealift,"
Seapower, September 1997, 18.
"China's rate was five percent higher than the world average with exports increasing 20.9 percent. Li
Ning, "China Enters Top Ten In World Trade," Beijing Review, 30 March-5 April 1998, 10.
l2According to forecasts by the Economic Research Institute, China's State Planning Commission,
cited in "Foreign Trade Forecasts for 1998," Beijing Review, 19-25 January 1998, 28.
13Yi,21.
China's maritime trading partners include over 1 80 nations. In 1 996, China expanded
its SFT strategy from traditional markets in Asia, Europe, and North America to focus more
on markets in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. In 1997, China's exports to Latin
America, Africa, and Oceania increased by 47, 24, and 22 percent, respectively. 14 In 1997,
over 50 percent China'sMMF capacity was devoted to handling foreign trade whose volume
totaled 185 million tons (MT); this represented an increase of 8.4 percent over 1996. 15
B. FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
Beijing's foreign policy emphasizes bilateral economic alliances rather than political
or ideological alliances. Beijing's strategy of "economic" diplomacy has expanded levels
of SFT with developing nations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. This
strategy is directed by China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC). Increases in SFT are facilitated by the "Chinese People's Association for
Friendship With Foreign Countries" and the "Chinese International Trade Development
Council," whose representatives visit several foreign nations each year.
SFT probably will increase following China's admission in the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Membership in the WTO would provide China with additional
opportunities to expand SFT linkages for importing and exporting desired commodities. In
1996, China's chances of admission were increased when Beijing reduced domestic tariffs
on over 4,000 categories of import items from a cumulative average of 35 percent to 23
14Ning, 11.
^Xinhua (Beijing), "Volume of Goods Transported for Foreign Trade," Foreign Broadcast
Information Service [Hereafter FBIS], 19 February 1998.
percent.
16 Levels of SFT and bilateral MSI cooperation have also increased due to China's
appointment to the executive committee ofthe International Maritime Organization (IMO). 17
Beijing's foreign policy and diplomacy emphasize bilateral economic cooperation for
mutual benefit based on "non-interference" in the internal affairs of foreign nations.
Beijing's foreign policy provides China with an advantage over nations whose foreign
policies require internal political reforms as conditions for bilateral economic cooperation.
Chinese Premier Li Peng summarized key aspects of Beijing's foreign policy that help to
increase levels of SFT:
China resolutely opposes hegemonism, power politics ... or interference in
the internal affairs of another nation under the pretext of ethnic, religious or
human rights issues. Relations with other states are never based on social
systems or ideologies. China has vigorously promoted regional economic
cooperation [and] vigorously explored ways to engage in mutually
complementary cooperation with other developing nations in the economic,
trade, scientific and technological sectors . . . and the establishment of a new
fair and equitable international political and economic order . . . . 18
Specific economic aspects ofChina's foreign policy are summarized by the following
principles: (1) Developing countries have the right to choose their own economic systems;
(2) Developing countries have the right to choose permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources; (3) International economic affairs should be managed by all nations, not
monopolized by one or two superpowers; (4) International trade should be managed and
,6PRC Embassy (Washington), 17 April 1998. As of April 1998, the WTO comprised 131 nations.
Members in the WTO generally have lower trade tariffs than non-members. China's admission to the WTO
would not impact negatively China's state-subsidized MSI because restrictions on subsidies to shipping
and shipbuilding are not fully covered by the WTO's provisions.
,7
"China's Shipping Prospects," Cargonews China, 1 May 1997. Online. Available
HTTP:http://web3.asial.com/sg/timesnet/dataycnc/docs/cnc0287.html, 15 June 1997.
18Premier Li Peng's Speech Before the 96th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, 19 September 1996.
Reprinted in PRC Embassy (Washington) "Main Characteristics of China's Foreign Policy," Online.
Available HTTP:http://www.china-embassy.org/cgi-bin/press.p 17207, 17 April 1998.
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accommodated on the basis of each other's needs. 19
Beijing's foreign policy strategy of "selective economic diplomacy" increases SFT
by targeting developing nations that have potential for China to obtain strategic resources for
importation. In 1995, China implemented a long-term foreign investment and direct aid
strategy with developing nations to establish access to strategic resources. Many of these
investments are actually subsidized loans to inefficient foreign enterprises.
In 1996, China granted favorable loans totaling $16 billion and committed foreign
investment totaling $42.35 billion; an increase of 2.2 percent over 1995. 20 In 1997, China
signed 38 subsidized loan agreements with 3 1 countries primarily in Africa, South America,
and Asia. The link between Beijing's strategy of increasing SFT and direct foreign
investment is best summarized by Minister Wu Yi, the current head of MOFTEC, who
stated: "We must devote major efforts to developing exports and maintaining their stable
growth . . . [and] promoting exports by combining them with foreign aid, economic and
technological cooperation and investment."21
As SFT increases, foreign nations are more likely to support China in international
politics. China has used SFT as leverage to gain international political support in the United
Nations when it has been threatened by economic sanctions or condemned for alleged human
rights abuses. China has used SFT as leverage for influencing nations, such as South Africa,
to give formal recognition to China and to curb economic and political relations with
19
"Jiang Proposes Guidelines for Developing Asian Ties," Beijing Review, 23-29 December 1996.
20PRC Embassy (Washington) "Foreign Economic Relations and Trade," Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.china-embassy.org/cgi-bin/press.pl?Im-exp.,l. 17 April 1998.
2,Ning, 12.
Taiwan. 22
In conclusion, China has maintained a focused foreign policy strategy of increasing
bilateral political and economic relations with developing nations throughout the 1990's.
Beijing's foreign diplomats and economic emissaries are vigorously engaging in bilateral
trade negotiations and economic diplomacy to increase levels of SFT. Beijing perceives it
has established long-term political and economic advantages with developing nations
through increasing levels of SFT and foreign investment. China's economic and political
influence increases commensurately as China's MSI expands its linkages in developing
regions to. increase SFT.
22China and South Africa established formal diplomatic relations on 1 January 1998. An editorial in
China's People's Daily commented on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries:
"Developing and consolidating friendly and cooperative relations with African countries is a significant
part of China's foreign policy. It is a common need of the two countries in their political and economic
cooperation.", cited in "China Forges Ties With South Africa," Beijing Review, 19-25 January 1998, 4.
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III. CHINA'S MARITIME SHIPPING INDUSTRY EXPANSION STRATEGY
Transport should be part of China's diverse strategy for foreign trade. It should have a
diverse strategy, especially in view of the financial turmoil in South East Asia.
Assistant Minister, MOFTEC, Liu Xiangdong,
Comment ofChina 's Foreign Trade Strategy, 1998
China's MSI expansion strategy includes increasing the size ofChina's MMF, ports,
cargo handling, shipbuilding and repair facilities. This infrastructure serves as a base from
which to gain influence over regional maritime shipping and trading networks. China's
MMF imports strategic resources to fuel China's rapid economic growth. It also profits
from transporting trade, building and repairing ships, and managing port facilities for foreign
nations. This expansion increases levels ofSFT and China's influence over the international
maritime transportation and trade of energy, industrial, and consumer goods.
A. SHIPPING
China's MSI is a state-owned conglomerate subject to centralized control and
direction. However, recent trends ofChina's MSI expansion indicate Beijing has liberalized
its control over the industry. This allows individual Chinese shipping companies more
flexibility in gaining market share ofhandling international trades. Therefore, China's MSI
expansion strategy results from both centralized decision making processes by the state and
initiatives by individual Chinese shipping companies to gain international market share.
China's MMF ranks third is the world measured by numbers of ships and container
11
handling capacity; behind Japan and Greece. 23 In 1997, China's MMF consisted of
approximately 2,000 ships comprising 35 million dead weight tons (MDWT).24 China's
largest shipping company, the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), has over 600
ships sailing on 120 international shipping routes between 1,200 ports to 160 countries and
regions.25 China's second largest shipping company, the China Shipping (Group) Company
(CSC) has over 400 ships comprising 8 MDWT.26 Between 1987-1997, China's MMF's
annual container handling capacity for all shipping companies increased by 27 percent
compared to the world's average of between 6-8 percent. 27
COSCO is diversifying its operations to include horizontal and vertical linkages
within international MSI networks. These linkages include international finance, air
transport, real estate, warehousing, freight forwarding, shipping terminal management,
insurance, and marine engineering. COSCO's future expansion plans include acquiring more
oil carriers, larger container, cargo, and bulk-carrying ships, and advanced technology for
building marine engines, navigation, communication, and ship equipment.28
23
"Top 15 Container Operators," F"airplay, 24 April 1997, 19.
24
Includes ships of all types over 1,000 gross registered tonnage (GRT) and 270 Chinese merchant
ships registered under foreign flags-of-convenience. The CIA World Factbook, (Washington D.C.: Central
Intelligence Agency, 1997), 99.
25
"Full Steam Ahead For Shipping Industry," Beijing Review, 19-25 January 1998, 27. COSCO
controls over 17 MDWT or 50 percent of China's MMF. In 1995, COSCO's breakdown by ship types was
35 percent for cargo ships, 20 percent for bulk carriers, 20 percent for container ships, and 25 percent for
oil and chemical product tankers. Sharon Cunningham, "Brokers See Chang in Business Profile," Lloyd's
List, 21 July 1997,7.
25The age of China's MMF is 18.7 years and is slightly older than the world average of 16.2 years.
Diane Stormont, "COSCO Moves to Unclog Arteries," Seatrade Review, November 1997, 55.
21Xinhua (Beijing), "Report on Container Shipping Industry," FBIS, 25 September 1997.
28
In 1997, COSCO was among the first Chinese commercial entities to operate an international
communications and database network separate from China's standard communications service provider.
This Electronic Data Information (EDI) communication network, links COSCO with over 1,100 foreign
shipping entities to track international cargo for its ship's manifests. Xinhua (Shanghai), "COSCO Global
Communications Network in Shanghai," 5 September 1997.
12
The return ofHong Kong to China adds approximately 20 percent to China's GDP. 29
With Hong Kong's shipping assets included under China's MSI; it now handles between 10
to 1 5 percent ofthe maritime transportation ofworld trade. China' s MSI benefits from Hong
Kong's robust shipping services which provide a deep-water port, lower taxes, finance,
insurance, and ship registry advantages. The Hong Kong-based Orient Overseas Container
Lines (OOCL) is one of the ten largest shipping companies in the world. China's MSI also
gains trade market share from capitalizing on OOCL's international shipping alliances and
port access relationships with foreign shipping companies and ports.
In 1997, China's MOFTEC initiated a large-scale consolidation of China's MSI to
improve efficiency, cut costs, increase profitability, and gain international market share. 30
As a result, CSC was formed by absorbing several smaller Chinese shipping companies
providing duplicating services. This led to CSC creating five separate fleets organized by
function for oil, bulk cargo, containers, passengers, and "special use"services. 31 COSCO
underwent a similar reorganization by concentrating its management and container fleet in
Shanghai; oil and gas tanker fleet in Dalian; general cargo and heavy lift fleet in Guangzhou;
LNG carrier fleet in Shenzhen; and its dry bulk fleet in Tianjin.32
29Gene Linn, "Maritime China Gears for a Big Year," Seatrade Review, December 1996, 67.
30This consolidation was under the guise of MOFTEC's "Measures Governing the Management of
International Cargo Agency Business" to "steer the market [China's MSI] in a rational and orderly
direction.", cited in Stormont, 56.
31The CSG's assets reportedly total $27.2 billion and include 400 merchant ships. Wang Zhide and
Feng Yizhen, "China Sets Maritime Transportation Strategy," Xinhua (Beijing), FBIS, 10 February 1998.
32Stormont, 57.
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B. SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIR
China is the third largest shipbuilding nation in the world with five percent of the
world market behind Japan and South Korea; having 50 percent and 33 percent of the world
market respectively. Shipbuilding is China's sixth largest domestic industry that
manufactures export products. Between 1992- 1996, China's MSI constructed 18.66MDWT
of ships for domestic and foreign recipients; representing a 31 percent annual increase. 33
In 1 996, 85 percent ofthe new merchant ships built by China's MSI were for export
which earned $1.19 billion in foreign exchange. 34 In 1997, China's MSI built $3.15 billion
worth of merchant ships comprising 2.29 MDWT, a 29.3 percent increase over 1996.35
China also exported $64 million worth of machinery, engines, and electronics for foreign
merchant ships; an increase of 50 percent over 1996. 36 In 1997, the China National
Shipbuilding Corporation alone exported ships worth $1.6 billion, an increase of 1 7 percent
over 1 996 when it exported ships worth $1.15 billion. 37 During 1 997, China contracted for
new shipbuilding orders worth $3.1 billion and by 2000 expects export revenues from these
new orders to reach $1.8 billion. 38
Beijing has directed that China's MSI increase its share of the world's demand for
new ships; which represents a $50 billion annual market. 39 Chinese MSI analysts estimate
"Xinhua (Beijing), "Growth in Shipbuilding Industry Since 1992," FBIS, 10 September 1997.
34Diane Stormont, "Aiming For 10% of World Market," Seatrade Review, November 1997, 65.
35
Ibid.
^Xinhua, (Beijing), "China's Shipbuilding Industry Witnesses Growth," FBIS, 26 February 1998.
"Ibid.
'""Chinese Builders Threatened," Fairplay, 29 January 1998, 14. China's shipbuilding is directed by
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). In January 1997, CSSC reported it had 81new ship
export orders of 1.32 MT; or 25 percent of China's MSI new building output. Xinhua,2\ February 1998.
"Anna Wilde Mathews, "Newport News Falters at Attempts to Build Commercial Cargo Ships," The
Wall Street Journal, 17 March 1998, 2.
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the world's market demand for new ships will reach between 35-45 MDWT by 2010, 50
percent higher than the previous 15-year average.40 Although China's MSI currently has
between 5-6 percent ofthe world shipbuilding market, that percentage has been targeted by
Beijing to increase to 10 percent by 2000 and to 20 percent by 201 0. 4 '
China's annual merchant ship production capacity increased from 0.7 MDWT in
1982 to 2.5 MDWT in 1997. China's shipbuilding infrastructure consists of 27 shipyards,
66 manufacturing plants, and 37 research and design centers for construction ofboth civilian
and military ships. 42 Expansion of China's MSI infrastructure enhances China's ability to
gain market share of ship exports. In 1 997, China invested 1 billion Yuan to expand its
shipbuilding industry's capacity by 1 MDWT for a total of 3.8 MDWT by 2000.43 Chinese
shipyards have recently constructed large 1 00,000 ton floating dry docks to build and repair
foreign merchant ships comprising between 150,000-300,000 tons.
China has 1,375 shipbuilding and ship repair companies ofwhich 78, or 6.3 percent
are Sino-foreign joint ventures. 44 China is consolidating its MSI infrastructure to achieve
greater economies of scale for production and purchasing industrial resources in bulk
quantities. China's MSI has also improved its proficiency in building bulk carriers, oil
tankers, dry cargo, container ships, chemical carriers, and natural gas carrier ships for export.
40
Li Rongxia, "Shipbuilding Industry Meets Challenges," Beijing Review, 13-19 October 1997, 23.
^Xinhua, 10 September 1997. By 1996, China had secured orders for new ships from Canada,
Finland, France, Greece, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan while gaining a seven
percent market share of the world's new shipbuilding orders. "Asia Dominates the Market," Cargonews
Asia, 5 November 1997. Online. Available HTTP:http:www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews, 17 April
1998. By comparison, the United States has a one percent share of the world new shipbuilding market.
"Shipbuilding-Nowhere to Sail," The Economist, 16-22 May 1998.
nXinhua, 26 February 1998.
*Xinhua, 10 September 1997.
"""Shipbuilding Industry Restructured," Beijing Review, 8-14 September 1997, 30.
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China receives advanced MSI-related technologies throughjoint ventures with Japan
under the auspices of the "Japan-China Marine Transportation Council" and the "Japan-
China Economic Association." These technologies include ship engineering, marine engine
production, sophisticated steel cutting techniques, computer aided ship design and
manufacturing.45 In 1995, Japan built 50 percent of China's bulk cargo fleet and 75 percent
of its container fleet;46 while delivering six 5,250 TEU large capacity container ships to
COSCO by 1997.47 Japan's Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), Hitachi Zosen, Mitsui, and
Mitsubishi Corporations have formed several MSI-related joint ventures in China, while
several hundred Chinese shipyard employees have been trained at KHI facilities in Japan.
The ship repair capability and low labor rates of China's MSI allow it to repair
foreign shipping at lower rates compared to shipyards in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
In 1997, the average monthly wage for a Chinese shipyard employee was $250.00 compared
to that ofJapan at $3,000 and South Korea at $2,000. 48 China's five largest ship repair yards
depend on foreign ships for 70-80 percent of their revenue.49
C. PORT INFRASTRUCTURE
Between 1992-1997, China's MSI port infrastructure expanded by 300 new ship
berths to quadruple its annual shipping container handling capacity. 50 With Shanghai,
China's largest port in the middle, ports on the U.S. East Coast and Europe are 10,500
45
"Shipyards Develop Chinese Links," Fairplay, 29 January 1998, 22.
A6China and World Shipping: An Analysis ofthe Impact ofChina on the World's Maritime Industries,
(London: Drewry Shipping Consultants, June 1995), 8.
1,1Cargonews Asia, 15 April 1997.
48Rongxia, 23.
49The five ports are Beihai, Chengxi, Nantong, Shanghaiguan, and Wenchong. David Hughes, "China
Yards a Force to be Reckoned With," Shipping Times (Singapore), 8 December 1 997.
50Xinhua (Beijing), "Xinhua Interviews Minister on Transport Progress," FBIS, 3 1 August 1997.
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nautical miles (NM) equal-distant. Shanghai has shipping links with 500 foreign ports and
600 shipping companies in over 170 countries. 51 China is also expanding its domestic
container, mineral, and oil port terminal infrastructure to accommodate larger merchant
ships. Between 1996-2000, China's port expansion calls for an additional 200 ship berths
with a handling capacity of 300 MT52 for a total of 1,665 coastal and deep-water berths. 53
In late 1997, COSCO moved its headquarters from Beijing to Shanghai to be co-
located with the newly established Shanghai Shipping Exchange (SSE). China's goal is to
expand Shanghai into an international maritime economic, financial, trading, and shipping
center for Asia. The creation of SSE as a shipping regulatory entity within Asia is already
enacting policies that favor China's MSI. SSE sets tariffrates and other shipping regulations
that must be adhered to by foreign companies engaged in MSI services and trades between
China and Asia.54
^Proceedings ofthe International Maritime Conference and Exhibition Conference, 5-8 December
1995, (Shanghai: Shanghai Society ofNaval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1995), 1-5.
""China's Shipping and Port Construction Booming," China Economic Window, 20 June 1997,
Online. Available HTTP:http//www.chinaeco.com, 10 August 1997.
"Ibid.
54Conrad Everhard, Chairman of Cho Yang America, commented on the future impact of SSE by
stating: "China will dominate the rules and regulations of the liner trade.", cited in Michael Fabey, "China:
The Next Japan?," trafficWORLD, 10 November 1997, 22.
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IV. CAUSES OF CHINA'S MARITIME SHIPPING DEPENDENCIES
Any disruption ofthe flow of oil from the Persian Gulfwould clearly have a damaging effect
on China's economy.
Secretary of Defense Cohen,
Speech Before the PLA Academy ofMilitary Science, Beijing, 1998
China's robust economy is characterized by the simultaneous effects of increasing
consumption and decreasing production of strategic energy, industrial, and food resources.
China's domestic resource production is declining in relative terms compared to
consumption. As a result, China's consumer and industrial economic sectors are dependent
on foreign imports of oil, gas, minerals, metals, chemicals, and food commodities. Hence,
China depends on its MMF and those of foreign nations to transport vital imports for
economic growth and stability.
A. CONSUMPTION VERSUS PRODUCTION
Between 1990-1994, China's annual oil consumption increased by eight percent
while its production increased by one percent. 55 China's domestic oil consumption
increased between 0.6-0.7 percent for each percentage increase in GDP. 56 In 1996, China
was the third largest oil consuming nation in the world and imported 1 60 million barrels of
foreign oil worth $3.4 billion; this represented a 37.5 percent increase over 1995. 57
In 1997, China's oil consumption was 3.8 million barrels per day (MBPD) while
55Maundouh G. Salameh, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict," International Association
for Energy Economics Newsletter, Summer 1996. Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.iaee.org/newsltr/96suml l.html, 20 July 1997.
56Drewry, 29.
"William M. Spodak, "Power Struggle," The China Business Review, March-April 1998, 25.
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production was 3.1 MBPD, representing a deficit filled by foreign imports of 0.7 MBPD. 58
By 2000, China's oil consumption is estimated to be between 4.4-5 .6 MBPD with production
at 3.0-3.5 MBPD; representing a deficit of between 1-2 MBPD. 59 By 2005, China's annual
consumption of all types of energy resources is estimated to rise by over six percent; this
represents an increase of nearly three times, or 160 percent from 1990 levels. 60
China's consumption of liquified natural gas (LNG) and liquified petroleum gas
(LPG) is less than two percent of its total energy consumption. By 2000, China's annual
consumption for LPG is estimated increase from its current level of six MT to nine MT. 61
By 2005, China's LPG consumption is estimated to reach 17 MT; this indicates China will
have to import eight MT or 50 percent of China's LPG demand. 62 The main reason for this
demand stems from China's efforts to rely less on coal as a primary energy source due its
adverse environmental effects from air pollution. Chinese consumers also prefer LPG
because it is a more convenient, efficient, and cleaner energy source for home use.
Levels of SFT also increase by China's desire to gain foreign market share for
China's exports of military hardware, chemicals, textiles, and machinery. China's civilian
and military industrial sectors require foreign imports ofbauxite, chromium, copper, cobalt,
iron ore, manganese, nickel, platinum, tin, titanium, and tungsten. China's chemical industry
58Diarmid O'Sullivan, "China Builds Trade Links With the Gulf," Middle East Economic Digest
[hereafter MEED], 3 1 October 1997, 2-3. Other Chinese sources indicate China's oil consumption in 1997
was 3.5 MBPD compared to 1996's level of 2.5 MBPD. Weijun Liu and Guochen Wan, "China to Import
Crude Oil from UAE," Asia Free Press, 20 August 1997.
"Chinese estimates. Xinhua (Beijing), "PRC Now Net Oil Importer," FBIS, 12 October 1997.
60Masayasu Ishiguro and Takamasa Akiyama, Energy Demand in Five Major Asian Developing
Countries, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, April 1995), 29. The Center for Global Energy Studies
(CGES) estimates China's oil demand will reach seven MBPD by 2005, cited in O'Sullivan, 3.
61




is expanding its production capabilities to export liquid bulk chemicals. In 1997, the value
of China's chemical exports totaled $15 billion; an increase of 21 percent over 1996.63 As
a result, increases in maritime shipping linked to China can be expected to occur in many of
the following regions possessing strategic minerals illustrated in Figure 1
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Figure 1. World's Mineral Distribution, 199364
China's military modernization and expansion requires greater levels of imports of
foreign minerals and metals to produce sophisticated alloys required for aircraft, jet engines,
rockets, armor plating, and ships. Foreign imports of resources are also used by China to
manufacture military hardware for export. The support from China's military elite to
increase military exports was summarized by one senior Chinese Army officer who stated:
The defense industry should try to develop products for export and expand
""Chemical Sector to Boost Exports," China Daily (Hong Kong ), FBIS, 22-28 February 1998, 8. In
1998, China's chemical export goal is to increase the value of exports to $16 billion; this represents an
increase of $1 billion over 1997. As China's chemical industry matures, future chemical exports will
include higher value-added products such as complex polymers and specialty chemicals. Ibid.
"Philip's World Atlas, (London: George Philip Ltd and Reed International Books, 1997), 27.
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exports. This will then open a source ofincome and accumulate funds to be
used for imports. It will facilitate links with the international market ... we
should constantly strengthen our competitiveness in the international market
and open new venues for our foreign trade. 65
China's reliance on foreign oil also results from decreasing domestic oil reserves and
oil industry productivity. Two-thirds ofChina's oil reserves are located in its interior where
production has declined. In 1997, China produced 140 MT of oil from onshore oilfields and
16.2 MT from offshore oilfields.66 Potential offshore oil reserves in the South China Sea
(SCS) remain unproven and cost-prohibitive for China to extract due to the expense of
equipment and technology required for drilling in deep water. China and foreign nations have
not made significant investments in oil extraction in the SCS due to the uncertainty of
finding oil and security concerns over competing claims in the region by other nations.
B. ENERGY IMPORT DEPENDENCIES
Between 1 994-1996, China's foreign oil imports increased by over 100 percent from
3 MT to 22.6 MT.67 In 1996, China produced 157 MT of oil, and spent $3.4 billion on 22
MT of foreign oil imports, or 1 3 percent of total oil consumption. 68 During the first nine
months of 1 997, China imported 24 MT of oil; this represents an increase of 54 percent over
the same period in 1 996. 69
By 2000, estimates for China's oil imports indicate they will double that of 1995
"General Ding Henggao, PLA, "Reforming Defense Science Technology and Industry," China
Military Science, Summer 1994, cited in Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views ofFuture Warfare,
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 166.
66China's domestic offshore oil production represents less than 10 percent of total production. Xinhua
(Beijing), "South China Sea Oil Company Leads in Offshore Output," FBIS, 25 February 1998.
"China's foreign oil import figure for 1996 represents an increase of 32.2 percent over 1995. Xinhua
(Beijing), FBIS, 12 October 1997.
6%Xinhua (Beijing), "PRC Needs to Exploit More Overseas Oil," FBIS, 16 October 1997.
69Xinhua, 12 October 1997.
22
levels to reach one MBPD and by 20 1 reach three MBPD. 70 By 20 1 0, estimates for China's
oil and gas imports are estimated to reach four MBPD71 and between 4-10 MT ofLNG/LPG
respectively. 72 By 2020, China's oil production is estimated at 200 MT and consumption at
415 MT; this indicates China's foreign oil imports will exceed 200 MT annually.73 Increases
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Figure 2. Major Crude Oil Exporters74
10The Strait ofHormuz: Global Shipping and Trade Implications in the Event ofClosure, (Suitland:
Office ofNaval Intelligence, August 1997), 62. Chinese estimates indicate that by 2000, China's annual oil
imports will triple to between 25-30 MT, or between 20-30 percent of total oil and gas consumption.
Figures are CNPC's estimates for net crude oil imports, cited in "China Net Crude Oil Imports to Triple by
2000," AP-Dow Jones News Service, 12 February 1997.
71Jacob Heilbrunn, "Facing Up to the Real China Problem," Los Angeles Times, 28 April 1997, 2. By
2010, oil import estimates total 7.8 MBPD for the U.S., 5.4 MBPD for Japan, and 1 .6 MBPD for South
Korea. Cited in David Hale, "Is Asia's High Growth Era Over?," The National Interest, Spring 1997, 55.
72
Peter Kemp, "LNG Risks Rise As Asia Turns Down," MEED, 20 March 1998, 2. By 2005, China's
imports of polyethylene are estimated to total 2.4 MT, an increase of 60 percent from current levels. "Asian
Promise Fuels Petrochemicals Push," Cargonews Asia, 29 March 1998.
73 Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century, (Washington D.C.: The World
Bank, 1997), 49.
74Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics, (London: TJ International Ltd., 1997), 307.
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China's inland transportation infrastructure is inadequate for transporting oil from
China's interior. It is cheaper and faster for China to import oil by ships to China's coast
where the majority ofChina's population and industry are located. China currently owns few
large capacity oil carriers, such as "very large crude carriers" (VLCCs), that are capable of
transporting large volumes of oil. China relies on foreign contracted VLCCs to import oil
from the Middle East, Africa, and South America. By 2010, China's foreign oil import
demand is estimated to require 500 VLCC trips annually. 75 To meet China's expected future
oil import demand, China has recently completed several new oil terminals capable of
handling VLCCs in Qingdao, Ningbo, and Guangdong Province. 76
China's decreasing oil production and increasing consumption increases China's
requirements ofdomestic and foreign MMF's to import oil. In response, China reorganized
its MSI to improve efficiency and is building more oil and gas carriers. In 1997, a new joint
venture between Hong Kong-based Ming Wan Shipping Company, China International
United Petroleum & Chemicals (UNIPEC), and Singapore-based Kangqi Oil formed
Eastbound Navigation Company for trading oil both in China and international markets. 77
In 1998, China created the Oil Tanker Company, comprised of96 oil tankers with a capacity
of 2.56 MT, or 50 percent of China's maritime transport capacity for oil. 78
75A typical VLCC carries between 200,00-300,000 DWT of oil. Daniel Y. Coulter, "China's
Economic Growth: A Function of Maritime Infrastructure," Office ofNaval Intelligence, 1997.
76These VLCC oil terminals are coincidently in close proximity to the PLAN'S fleet concentration
bases of the North Sea Fleet (Qingdao), East Sea Fleet (Ningbo), and South Sea Fleet (Guangdong).
Mathew Flynn, "New Oil Player Born," Lloyd's List Maritime Asia, July 1997, 4-5.
"Ming Wah's seven VLCCs and other oil tankers of smaller size have a carrying capacity of over
three million MT. Ibid., 4-5.
78Zhide and Yizhen.
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C. INDUSTRIAL AND FOOD IMPORT DEPENDENCIES
According to the Organization For Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), "Contrary to popular perception, China is not rich in non-fuel minerals" and "In
many products, domestic Chinese ores are often remote from markets, high-cost, and of
inferior quality."
79 As a result, China's primary import dependencies on strategic foreign
resources include iron ore, coal, grain, and other minerals. China's imports of chromium,
cobalt, manganese, and platinum are primarily from the Former Soviet Union and Africa. 80
Steel production is a major industry that China depends upon for economic
development. 81 Since 1988, China's annual iron ore and energy imports have increased
steadily to meet steel production demand. Between 1 989- 1 994, iron ore imports increased
from 12.5 MT to 37.3 MT, a 200 percent increase. 82 In 1996, China became the world's
largest steel manufacturer with an annual output of 101.1 MT. 83
By 2000, China's iron ore imports are estimated to reach 50 MT, or a 10-15 percent
share of the world's market for iron ore. 84 By 2010, China's annual steel production is
estimated to increase to 1 60 MT, thus increasing China' s foreign iron ore imports to between
10-20 percent of consumption. 85 As a result, increases in maritime shipping of iron ore
19China in the 21st Century: Long-Term Global Implications, (Paris: Organization For Economic Co-
Operation and Development [hereafter OECD], 1996), 15.
80See Kent Hughes Butts, Strategic Minerals in the New World Order (Leavenworth: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College), 30 November 1993, 99.
81Due to its inefficient use of energy, China's iron and steel industry consumed nearly 30 percent of
China's total energy consumption in 1991, thus further increasing oil imports. OECD, 104.
82Drewry, 93.
SiPRC Embassy (Washington) "Some Facts and Figures for China in 1996," 2 October 1997. Online.
Available HTTP:http://www.china-embassy.org/cgi-bin/press.pl?324. 15 December 1997.
84
Ibid. See "China Came the First In Steel Output," Beijing Review, 20-26 January 1997, 5.
85OECD, 105.
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imports by China from foreign nations can be expected in several of the following ports
depicted in Figure 3 . China's foreign iron ore imports are from Brazil, Australia, Peru, South
Africa, North Korea, and Venezuela. 86
Figure 3. Major Iron Ore Exporters and Ports87
Coal provides 75 percent of China's energy needs. By 2000, coal consumption for
China's electricity generation is estimated to increase 30-40 percent from 1993 levels. 88
Although China is the world's fifth largest coal producer, it relies on foreign imports ofcoal
from Australia, New Zealand, North Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar, and South Africa. If
China's domestic coal production of continues to decrease and consumption increases,
increases in maritime imports by China from foreign nations can be expected in the
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Figure 4. Major Coal Exporters and Ports89
China's current population of over 1.2 billion is expected to increase to 1.4 billion
by 2010 and to 1 .7 billion by 2025, or between 22-24 percent of the world's total.90 Much
of China's land mass is not suitable for farming due to urban growth and soil erosion. To
feed its population, China imports five percent ofits grain consumption , or 75 million metric
tons (MMT), primarily from Australia, Argentina, Canada, and the United States.91
By 2020, estimates for China's consumption of grain will be just under 700 MMT
while production will be between 600-670 MMT.92 As a result, China's grain imports will
be between 30-90 MMT; this represents an increase in import dependence as high as 14
percent of total grain consumption.93 The OECD cites other estimates that indicate China's
89Stopford, 322.
^OECD.B.
'"'Taiwan Plans Grain Hub," Fairplay, 31 July 1997, 57.





grain imports could reach between 100-200 MMT by 2015. 94 As a result, China can be






Figure 5. Major Grain Exporters and Ports95
In conclusion, estimates based on China's current consumption and production
indicate it will be among the world's largest importers of strategic resources in the near
future.
96 A majority ofthese imports will be from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South
America. China's economic growth and stability will be depend upon maritime shipping in
these regions. China's import requirements for resources are beyond China's MMF's
handling capability and will cause China to depend upon foreign MMFs to handle SFT.
94OECD, 14. While China's per capita consumption of grain is estimated to slightly decrease,
consumption of meat and fish is estimated to double by 2010. This will result in China increasing its
imports of meat and livestock from Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and the United States. OECD, 13.
95Stopford, 326.
96By 2020, China is expected to be the world's third largest oil and gas importer with annual oil import
costs reaching $200 billion. In comparison, the cost for China's total imports of all commodities in 1996
totaled $132 billion. Hale, 55.
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V. SINO-FOREIGN MARITIME ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCES
From the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, China's need for a reliable and efficient supply
of energy to fuel its growth can make it a force for stability in these strategically critical
regions.
President Clinton, Address on China and the National Interest, 1997
Beijing pursues SFT with developing nations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America to increase imports of energy, industrial, and agriculture resources. Several
new energy production facilities in developing nations will be operational in the near future.
The Asian financial crisis has led to lower energy demand in Asia, except for China. As a
result, foreign oil producers are motivated to increase their energy exports to China.
China's imports of strategic resources are increasing through the expansion of large-
scale Chinese energy and industrial construction projects in foreign countries. 97 Between
1 979- 1 996, China signed 1 07,000 overseas contracts for such projects valued at $60 billion.98
In 1996, the value ofnew overseas contracts totaled $10 billion, a 6.2 percent increase over
1995. 99 In 1997, China signed 28,400 contracts totaling $1 1.36 billion; an increase of 10.5
percent over 1996. 10° In 1997, 27 of the world's 225 largest contractors were Chinese. 101
As ofOctober 1997, China had 230 foreign contracts, worth $1 .6 billion, to develop
97China has actual or committed oil and gas-related investment in Canada, Peru, Thailand, Indonesia,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Xinhua, (Beijing), FBIS, 12 October
1997. Other projects include coal production, metallurgy, geology, machine-building, chemicals, ports,




100Gao Wei, "Diversification To Aid Contractors," China Daily (Hong Kong), FBIS, 22-23 February
1998, 1.
'"'According to a U.S. Engineering News Record. Ibid.
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foreign oil and gas reserves. 102 In 1996, China imported 700,000 tons ofcrude oil originating
from Sino-foreign cooperative oil productionjoint ventures in foreign nations. 103 As of 1 998,
China has committed over $8 billion to acquire oil field concessions or joint production
rights with over 23 countries to include Azerbaijan, Canada, Italy, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. 104
China's liberalization of its MSI is resulting in more foreign shipping companies
handling SFT. In 1995, China had 230 companies engaged in international maritime
transportation, of which 77 were Sino-foreign joint ventures. In 1997, foreign shipping
companies operated on 140 of China's 220 international trade routes. 105 As of early 1998,
foreign shipping companies had established over 400 representative offices in China and had
120 joint ventures with China's MSI. 106 China's MSI has bilateral cooperative shipping
relationships with shipping companies from 45 foreign nations and port relations with over
20 foreign ports. 107 China is a member of 1 1 organizations and a signature country to 37
conventions relating to the international MSI. 108
China's COSCO has an alliance with Japan's K-Line and Taiwan's Yang Ming
shipping companies. Together they rank fifth in terms ofcargo handling capacity among the
102According to Qin Anmin, manager with the China Petroleum Engineering Construction Company
(CPEC) in a speech to the 15 th World Petroleum Congress. Xinhua (Beijing), "PRC Needs to Exploit More
Overseas Oil," FBIS, 16 October 1997.
103
Ibid.
104David B. Ottaway and Dan Morgan, "China Pursues Ambitious Role in Oil Market," The
Washington Post, 26 December 1997, p. AOL
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world's six major shipping alliances. 109 Hong Kong-based OOCL is a member ofthe Grand
Alliance, 1 10 the largest of the top six alliances. China's MSI expansion strategy within these
and expected future alliances, to increase SFT in developing regions, is described by a high-
ranking Chinese bureaucrat who stated:
Transport should be part of China's diverse strategy for foreign trade . . .
especially in view ofthe financial turmoil in South East Asia. China should
consolidate markets in Europe and America and put more energy into Africa,
the Middle East, Commonwealth of Independent States, Eastern Europe,
Latin America, South Asia, and the South Pacific. 111
Foreign shipping companies are expanding their alliances with China's MSI to profit
from China's strategic resource import requirements. In 1997, the U.K.'s P&O Bulk
Shipping division formed a joint venture with China's Shougang Group by joining their dry
bulk fleets to import iron ore from Chinese-owned mines in Peru. 112 China's COSCO also
cooperates with Japan's Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL), Nippon Yushen Kaisha (NYK) 113 and
South Korea's Hanjin to handle trade between Asia, Europe, and North America. 114
In 1997, COSCO employed over 12,000 Chinese crewman on foreign-owned ships
to include Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States. 115 In 1998, a new subsidiary of
COSCO was formed to provide foreign nations' MSI with Chinese personnel to crew ships
109
"Top Six Line Up For Battle," Cargonews Asia, 12 March 1998, Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews. 17 April 1998.
110Besides OOCL, the Grand Alliance includes P&O Nedlloyd, Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, and MISC.
'"According to Liu Xiangdong, MOFTEC. Xinhua (Beijing), "Transport Part of Foreign Trade
Strategy," FBIS, 20 February 1998.
112This entity owns one of the world's largest fleets of this class with 27 ships comprising 4.3 million
DWT. "P&O Merges Its Bulk Fleet," Fairplay, 4 December 1997, 7.
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Philip Damas, "COSCO Enters Space-Sharing Deal," American Shipper, October 1996, 9.
""Paul Richardson, "Hanjin Introduces CAX II," Cargonews China, March 1998. Online. Available
HTTP:http://web3.asial.com.sg/timesnet/dataycnc/docs/cnc0359.html, 25 March 1998.
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and provide port engineering, technical, and management services. 116 COSCO's maritime
colleges graduate over 1 ,200 merchant ship officers and ratings annually. Chinese masters,
second officers, and bosuns are paid between 25-50 percent less than their counterparts in
India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea or the United Kingdom.
A. ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC
In Asia, Beijing focuses on increasing of SFT with nations comprising the
Association ofEast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, and Taiwan. 117 China's strategy for
increasing its political and economic influence with ASEAN is to participate in bilateral and
multilateral economic and political forums. 118 In 1996 China was admitted to the post-
ministerial conference as a full dialogue partner in ASEAN. China's influence is exerted
through five multilateral forums which include the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation
Committee, the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Political Consultations, ASEAN-China Joint
Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation, ASEAN-China Joint Committee on
Science and Technolgoy, and the ASEAN Committee in Beijing. 119
Between 1986-1996, Sino-ASEAN trade increased from $3.35 billion to $20.4
billion, an annual increase of over 20 percent. 120 In 1997, bilateral trade volume totaled
116This subsidiary is the China Ocean Shipping Seamen International Technical Service Company.
Zhide and Yizhen.
117ASEAN comprises nine members and includes: Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar
(Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
118One example was at the 1997 Conference of the UN Human Rights Committee when the majority of
ASEAN nations did not support condemning China over alleged human rights abuses.
U9PRC Embassy (Washington), "China, ASEAN Strengthens Dialogue Mechanisms," 27 February
1997, Online. Available HTTP:http://www.china-embassy.org/cgi-bin/press. 17 April 1998.
l20He Kai, "Looking Back and to the Future of China-ASEAN Relations," Beijing Review, 23
February- 1 March 1998, 6.
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$17.3 billion, a 23.8 percent increase over 1996. 121 In 1996, ASEAN 's investment in China's
economy consisted of 12,342 joint ventures totaling $34.3 billion. 122 As ofmid- 1997, China
had 529 commercial joint ventures in ASEAN valued at $850 million. 123 In 1997, Chinese
Premier Li Peng led a 40-member Chinese trade delegation to encourage bilateral trade and
investment with Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand. In 1997, political and
business leaders from Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam visited China to
discuss measures for increasing bilateral trade and investment.
In 1997, China's exports to ASEAN increased by 6.6 percent and represented 29
percent of China's total foreign exports. 124 In 1997, China's foreign investment in energy
and construction in Asia totaled $8.37 billion or 74 percent of China's total overseas foreign
investment. 125 China's primary imports from ASEAN include oil, LNG, LPG, grain, sugar,
palm oil, wood, rubber, and tin. China's primary energy imports from the Asia-Pacific
region come from Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand.
In response to the Asian financial crises, China hosted a conference during July 1 997,
where leading banking officials from the Asia-Pacific region met to discuss measures to
alleviate economic distress. One result was that Beijing granted Thailand a $1 billion loan
to help that country's economy to recover. At the end of 1997, China and ASEAN issued a
joint statement that: "The focus in 1998 will be on promoting bilateral trade, economic
,21
lbid.
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relations, and collaboration on regional and sub-regional economic projects [and] promote
trade and investment, improve mutual market access and technology flow." 126
1. Case Study: Singapore
Since 1 995, Sino-SingaporeanMSI cooperation has increased significantly after both
nations agreed to allow COSCO ships permission to fly the Singapore flag. In 1 995 bilateral
maritime shipping handled $6.85 billion worth of goods, an increase of 27 percent over
1 994 127 jn 1995^ shipping container volume increased by 60 percent over 1995 as a result
of a 22 percent increase in Chinese imports from and a 30 percent increase in exports to
Singapore/ 28 In 1 997, China's MSI gained a 22 percent market share of Singapore's foreign
new ship construction orders with 20 ships comprising 493,203 DWT. 129
Since 1996, COSCO has used Singapore as its base for Sino-foreign shipping
operations in Asia. In 1997, China's COSCO and Singapore's Port of Singapore Authority
(PSA) signed a long-term bilateral shipping terminal services agreement to set shipping
prices and regular shipping schedules. 130 This expanded COSCO' s access to Singapore as
a regional base for repairing its ships and transhipping containers within and without the
Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, COSCO bought a 60 percent share in Singapore's Sun
Corporation, a shipping and oil-trading company to facilitate oil imports to China. 131
PSA is one ofthe largest companies specializing in constructing and managing ports
126
Ibid., 7.
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for foreign countries. PSA is upgrading maritime transportation infrastructure in the Chinese
ports of Dalian, Changsu, Shanghai, Suzhou, and Taicang. PSA also cooperates with
China's MSI by providing it access to port terminals and warehouses in several international
foreign ports. 132 PSA and its subsidiaries have either constructed or provided shipping-
related services to ports in Brunei, Cambodia, French Polynesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the
Philippines, Italy, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Oman, South Korea, Kenya, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 133
2. Case Study: Thailand
Thailand is motivated to expand Sino-Thai MSI cooperation to increase Thai exports,
improve its port infrastructure, reduce maritime transportation costs, and increase its
domestic shipping capacity. China wants to export manufactured goods to Thailand and
import energy and agricultural products. In 1997, China and Thailand signed several
agreements to promote Sino-Thai maritime trade and MSI cooperation. The benefits to
China's COSCO include increased market share oftransporting Thailand's foreign trade and
access to Thailand's ports. While full implementation of these agreements is still pending,
a Thai Transport Ministry official said details of these agreements include:
Training exchanges ofpersonnel in maritime businesses, mutual cooperation
for the respective commercial fleets, and the PRC'S assistance in the
establishment ofa newjoint venture company to manage Thailand's national
132The majority of PSA's foreign port management and construction agreements involve long-term
projects. One example is a 20-year contract between PSA and Yemen to manage the Port of Aden which
will offer transhipment service for cargo between East Africa, the Middle East and outside the region.
Felix Chan, "PSA Takes Equity Stake in Aden Terminal Project," Cargonews Asia, 22 October 1997.
Online. Available HTTP:http://www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews. 19 April 1998.
'""First Asia, Then the World: PSA Corp Goes Global," Fairplay, 19 March 1998, 20-22.
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merchant fleet, the Thai Shipowners Association (TSA). 134
Reportedly, Thailand's then Prime Minister Chavalit personally intervened on
COSCO's behalf to support its proposed 49 percent ownership bid for TSA. However,
Chavalit received criticism for his actions by Thai government officials fearful of giving
China too much control over Thailand's MSI. Despite these disagreements, COSCO
continues to increase levels of Sino-Thai MSI cooperation. In 1997, COSCO began using
the Thai port ofLaem Chabang for transhipping cargo between Thailand, Japan, and the U.S.
COSCO offered this service at rates 30-40 percent lower than similar rates and services for
cargo transhipped through Singapore. 135
Through these agreements, Beijing influenced Bangkok to establish a "Sino-Thai
Cooperative Maritime Fund." 136 The purpose ofthis fund is to finance expansion ofthe TSA
and offset capital reductions in Thailand's MSI budget due to Thai budget short falls.
Beijing also influenced Thailand to waive terminal handling and "bill-of-lading" charges for
COSCO ships calling in Thailand. 137 Thailand also agreed to guarantee that COSCO ships
be allocated 20,000 TEUs annually and failure to do so would result in fines on TSA of$200
per TEU below the established quotas. 138
3. Case Study: Malaysia
The motivations of Sino-Malaysian MSI cooperation are found in China's
134
"Thai on the Rack, COSCO Tightens the Noose Round Chavalit," Fairplay, 1 May 1997, 18.









requirements to import oil, palm oil, tin, copper, iron ore, and bauxite from Malaysia.
Malaysia needs to earn foreign exchange by increasing its exports to China and other nations,
particularly in the wake of the Asian financial crises. Malaysia's privatization of its MSI
infrastructure in Klang, Penang, Kuantan, Pasir Gudang, and Bintulu has also encouraged
cooperation by providing opportunities for China's MSI to invest in Malaysia's MSI. 139
In 1 997, a delegation of six senior Chinese trade and political officials conducted an
eight-day visit in Malaysia to increase the level of Sino-Malaysian joint production of
petrochemicals and other natural resources. 140 One current Sino-Malay joint venture is the
Salutary Insign which manufactures petrochemicals for export to China. 141 CNPC also has
a joint agreement with Malaysia's Petronas to develop Malaysian-owned oil fields.
In 1 997, a Sino-Malaysian shipping company, Perkapalan Shanghai-Sino (M) Bhd's
(PSS), was formed between Shanghai-based Sinotrans and the Penang-based Su Hock
Company. According to one Malaysian PSS executive who stated: "Trade volume between
China and Malaysia is definitely growing and there is therefore a need for us to serve our
principal, Sinotrans ... as well as other Chinese shipping lines in the future." 142
In 1997, of Malaysia's total foreign ship orders, China accounted for six ships
comprising 273,000 DWT or 23 percent of the total. 143 Since 1995, COSCO has owned a
majority share ofCoslink, a Sino-Malaysianjoint venture, with the Malaysia's Chung Chiao
139
"The Chase Is On: Peninsula Ports Strive For Market Share," Fairplay, 27 November 1997, 44.
,40Proposed projects included those related to petroleum resin, palm oil, blended oil solvents, clay, and
rubber. "China Holds Big Potential for Malaysian Products," Malaysia Star News, 15 April 1997.
l41China owns a 70 percent share in this joint venture. Ibid.
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Shipping and Guan Guan Shipping. 144 During 1995, COSCO carried more than 40 percent
ofSino-Malaysian trade. 145 In 1 995, Sino-Malaysian trade increased by 50 percent over 1 994
primarily due to China being the largest recipient of Malaysian palm oil exports.
China's MMF can be expected to increase its handling of Sino-Malaysian trade due
to COSCO's consolidation and expansion of its MSI presence in Malaysia. Further Sino-
Malaysianjoint ventures inMSI cooperation and resource production will result in additional
maritime transportation requirements of bulk petrochemicals for China's MMF. China's
MSI is increasing the level ofits operations in the Malaysian ports ofKlang, Kuantan, Sabah,
and Sarawak due to their close proximity to sources of oil, gas, and palm oil. 146
4. Case Study: Myanmar
Sino-Myanmar annual bilateral trade currently exceeds $1.5 billion. Myanmar has
both onshore and offshore oil reserves that China wants to import. China represents a market
for Myanmar' s exports. China' s political and economic relationships with Mynamar provide
China with commercial and potential naval access to Myanmar' s ports. It is faster and
cheaper for China to import and export commodities to China's Southwestern interior
provinces through Myanmar' s ports. China's MMF handles commodities in Myanmar'
s
ports, from where they transported by rail between these ports and the Sino-Myanmar border.
In 1997, China was the only foreign supplier of new merchant ship orders for
Myanmar. Upon delivery by late 1998, three dry cargo ships comprising 27,000 DWT for
,44
lbid.
,45Sid Astbury, "COSCO Builds Presence in Malaysia," Cargonews Asia, 24 April 1995.
"""Malaysia is the world's largest exporter of palm oil. In 1996, China imported 87 MT of palm oil
from Malaysia. "Pressure on Palm Oil," Fairplay, 27 November 1997, 47.
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the Yangon-based Myanmar Five Star Line Company, will have increased Myanmar's total
shipping capacity by 5 percent. 147 In addition to exporting merchant ships to Myanmar,
China's MSI has exported naval combatants to Myanmar including 16 Hainan class patrol
boats (PBs). 148 Reportedly, Myanmar has ordered two Jianghu class frigates and 1 additional
Hainan PBs from the China Shipbuilding Trading Company. 149
Since 1988, China's MSI has assisted Myanmar in building commercial port
facilities.
150
In 1996, the Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), formed ajoint
venture with Singapore's C&P Holdings to build and operate a one KM-long ship berth and
container terminal at the port of Thilawa, near Yangon. 151 In 1997, the Shanghai-based
ZMPC crane manufacturing company signed a contract to supply three shipyard gantry
cranes for installation at Thilawa. 152
5. Case Study: Taiwan
China's foreign resource dependencies also influence levels oftrade between China
and Taiwan. In 1 997, China and Taiwan agreed to begin direct cross-strait maritime shipping
between each other's ports. 153 In April 1997, China's COSCO and Taiwan's Yang Ming
shipping companies began limited direct sailing of their foreign-flagged ships between the
wFairplay, 17 April 1997, 26.
148Kay Merrill, "A Closer Look at Sino-Burmese Military Links," Jane 's Intelligence Review, July
1997, 323.
M9Micool Brooke, "The Armed Forces of Myanmar," Asian Defence Journal, January 1998, 14.
I50
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151HPH is a major international port construction and management company. "Global Options," Cargo
Systems, December 1996, 52.
152Each crane will have a lift capacity of 40 tons. Cargo Systems, January 1997, 38.
mXinhua (Beijing), "China-Taiwan: Beijing, Taipei Take Breakthrough First Step on Direct
Shipping," FBIS, 30 January 1997.
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Chinese ports ofFuzhou and Xiamen in Fujian province and Taiwanese port ofKaohsiung.
'
54
The current level of direct cross-strait shipping is low. However, as these levels
increase, Beijing will be better able to use these links and its MSI to gain economic influence
if it can increase Taiwan's maritime economic dependency on China. Taiwan already serves
as a "transhipment hub" for imports and exports between China and foreign markets.
Bilateral MSI cooperation between the two nations also involves shipping service
cooperation to transport foreign trade to other nations. China's future intentions include
using COSCO to earn profits from carrying trade to the West Coast ofthe United States via
Taiwan. 155 China's COSCO and Taiwan's Yang Ming shipping companies have a vessel-
sharing agreement to handle trans-Atlantic trade. 156
In July 1997, Taiwan's state-owned Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC)
announced it would build a large oil refinery and petrochemical complex in Taiwan. When
complete this new complex is expected to produce paraxylene and benzene for export to
China. In 1997, Taiwan announced it would cooperate with companies from Japan and
South Korea to build Asia's largest transhipment center for exporting agriculture products
to China. When completed this center, to be located in southern Taiwan, can be expected to
increase maritime shipping of agriculture products between China and the region.
wReuters, cited in "Taiwan Gives Nod to Yang Ming, Cosco For Cross-Strait Sailing," Cargonews
Asia, 9 April 1998, Online. Available HTTP:http://www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews. 24 April
1998.
'"Julian Baum, "A Long Wait Ahead," FEER, 30 April 1998, 68.
156Marcus Hand, "Yang Ming to Join New World's Asia-Med Service," Cargonews Asia, 15 March
1998. Online. Available HTTP:http://www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews.pl, 24 April 1998.
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6. Case Study: Australia
China relies on Australia for imports of metals, minerals, and agriculture products.
Australia relies on China as a source of export earnings. China is Australia's third largest
trading partner. In 1997, bilateral trade totaled over $5 billion. During 1997 in Beijing,
China's Premier Li Peng told visiting Australian Prime Minister John Howard that: "With
China and Australia able to provide each other with needed commodities, China foresees a
bright future for bilateral economic cooperation." 157 During the same visit, China's Vice-
Premier Zhu Rongji said: "Australia's Asia-oriented policy and China's opening-up have
bound the two countries together as significant trade and investment partners." 158
The value of Sino-Australian economic cooperation is increasing Beijing's political,
economic, and security influence with Canberra. This influence is described by one Asia
security analyst, commenting on Australian Prime Minister John Howard's "fence-mending"
visit to Beijing in 1 997, stated: "The recent White Paper on Australia' s trade and diplomatic
interests issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade identified China as one of
Australia's most important 21 st Century relationships." 159
China's food import dependencies from Australia are meat, grain, fish, fruit,
vegetables, livestock, wheat, barley, maize, lentils, and canola. Since 1990, China has
depended on iron ore imports from Australia. A majority of this ore originates from two
Sino-Australian joint ventures in which China has a 40 percent ownership stake in two
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mines. 160 Sino-Australian MSI cooperation can be expected to increase due to China's need
for Australia' s minerals and food products and China' s investment Australian ports. 161 China
is further motivated to use its influence with Australia to gain MSI linkages and access to
strategic resources by capitalizing on Australia's relationships with nations in the Western
Pacific.
162
In 1997, Australia supported China politically by reversing for the first time its
previous support for the UN's annual resolution condemning Beijing's human rights policies.
Beijing influenced Canberra to drop its support this resolution by offering economic trade
incentives which would help Australia's economy. In June 1 997, China's Vice Premier Zhu
Rongji visited Australia and said: "Australia is China's fastest growing trade partner [and
China] pledges to expand wool imports and invest more in Australia's iron ore industry. 163
B. THE MIDDLE EAST, CENTRAL ASIA, AND PERSIAN GULF
Levels of China's SFT in the Middle East and Central Asia be expected to increase
due to China's desire to increase oil, LNG, and LPG imports from secure and reliable sources
and suppliers. The regions ofthe Middle East and Central Asia, depicted in Figure 6, contain
approximately 70 percent of the world's oil reserves and 40 percent of gas reserves. 164
China desires to gain market share for its export commodities in the region. In 1995, the
value of Sino-Middle East trade exceeded $5 billion, with China's exports to the region
160Drewry, 28.
161China is motivated to import resources such as aluminum, manganese, nickel, gold, silver, and
uranium, of which Australia is a major exporter.
162China is interested in increasing SFT with Papua New Guinea which has large reserves of Oil, LNG,
cobalt, nickel, gold, and other minerals. See "PNG on the Edge," Fairplay, 14 May 1998, 20-21.
163
"Cheap Chinese Arms," Asian Defence Journal, July 1997, 58.
164The Caspian Sea is considered part of Central Asia. See Michael S. Lelyveld, "Greater Asian Role
Seen in Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea," Journal ofCommerce, 12 November 1997, 20.
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nearly double that of its imports 165
Figure 6. The Middle East and Caspian Sea Regions 166
Middle East oil producers desire to secure long-term and reliable export markets for
their petrochemicals. 167 By 2002 there will be six new large-capacity oil, gas, and
petrochemical facilities in the Middle East producing petrochemicals export to foreign
markets. 168 The region also represents a large potential market for imports of Chinese
consumer, industrial, and military goods. Although Chinese goods are often of inferior
quality compared to Western goods, they are cheaper and can be re-exported by importers
within and without the region.
,650'Sullivan, 2-3.
^Lloyd's Maritime Atlas of World Ports and Shipping Places, (Essex: Lloyd's of London, 1995), 9.
167Middle East oil suppliers desire to seek markets in Asia as the reliance by Western recipients of oil
in the region decline. In 1996, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the largest petrochemicals
producer in the region, exported 45 percent of its total production to Asia; 15 percent to the Western
Hemisphere; and 9 percent to Europe. Robert Trevelyn, "Sabic's Third Wave Set to Engulf Rivals,"
MEED, 3 October 1997,2.
l68Of these six facilities, three are in Saudi Arabia, and one each is in Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. Ibid.
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In addition to economic motivations, China has political motivations for increasing
levels ofSFT with nations in the region. Because these nations include the Islamic states of
Iran and Kazakhstan, China may consider that such interdependence could positively
influence the stability of the Islamic majority populations in China's Northwest provinces.
In 1998, Beijing strengthened Sino-Middle East economic and political relations by hosting
senior political officials from Iran, Pakistan, and Yemen. 169 During these visits, Beijing
emphasized bilateral economic cooperation to import strategic energy resources and export
Chinese consumer goods and military hardware.
1. Overview of China's Regional Resource Dependencies
China imports crude oil and gas primarily from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Iran,
Qatar, and UAE. China's largest Middle East trading partners, ranked by levels of bilateral
trade volume, are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Oman, Israel, Kuwait, and Syria. 170
In February 1996 the first meeting of the "Sino-Saudi Arabia Mixed Trade and
Economic Committee met to increase bilateral economic cooperation. China imports crude
oil, petrochemicals, and fertilizers from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Aramco has also signed
agreements with China's Wuhan Petrochemicals and CNPC to build oil refining facilities in
Southeast China. 171 When these facilities are completed they are expected to refine portions
of China's oil imports from Saudi Arabia. A Sino-Saudi agreement reached in late 1997




In 1997, Saudi Aramco, Exxon, and China's CNPC and Wuhan Petrochemicals agreed to conduct a
feasibility study for a joint petrochemical project in Wuhan. If completed, the facility would increase
China's annual refining capacity by 160,000 BPD. Saudi News Agency (Riyadh), "Saudi, Chinese, U.S.
Sign Accord on Petrochemical Project," FBIS, 13 October 1997.
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indicates China will triple the volume of Saudi crude oil imports from 20,000 BPD to 60,000
BPD. 172 By 2000, China's imports of Saudi oil are estimated to reach 350,000 BPD. 173
In 1995, the China Petroleum Construction Engineering Corporation (CPCEC)
reached a $400 million agreement with Kuwait to build two oil processing facilities. 174 In
June 1997, CNPC bought 50 percent of Iraq's Al-Ahdab oilfield as part of a 26-year, $1.2
-2.0 billion Sino-Iraqi joint oil production agreement. 175 In 1997, China and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) reached agreements whereby China is expected to import larger amounts
ofcrude oil, fertilizers, and aluminum. 176 Future partnership opportunities for Sino-Middle
East energy and industrial joint ventures exist in Egypt, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, and Yemen.
2. Case Study: Iran
China is gaining a major presence in Iran's oil industry which is the third largest
producer in OPEC and controls nearly 10 percent of world's total oil reserves. Iran
represents a major future oil export outlet for oil and gas originating from the Caspian region,
which is illustrated in Figure 7. 177 Oil from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,






,75A1 Ahdab has estimated crude oil reserves of 140 million tons. CNPC's foreign oil acquisitions have
contributed to increasing its production revenue from $6 billion in 1993 to $21 billion in 1997. Trish
Saywell and Ahmed Rashid, "Innocent Abroad," FEER, 26 February 1998, p. 47-50. Other sources
indicate the agreement include CNPC investing $2 billion over a 26 year period to develop the Al Ahdab
oilfield. "China Expected to Grow: Analysts Assess Market Opening," Fairplay, 29 January 1998, 27-28.
176The UAE imports nearly one-third of China's total exports to the Middle East. Liu and Wan.
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In areas near the Caspian Sea region, Iran has oil reserves of 12 billion barrels (BB) and gas reserves
of 1 1 trillion cubic ft (TCF); Azerbaijan has oil reserves of between 31-38 BB and gas reserves of 46 TCB;
and Turkmenistan with 34 BB of oil and gas reserves of between 257-3 14 TCB, cited in Steve Levine,
"Instability by the Barrelful?: Central Asia's Coming Oil Bonanza and Its Consequences," New York
Times, 17 February 1998, CI.
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on the Black Sea and Iran's ports in the Persian Gulf. 178
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Figure 7. Oil Export Routes of the Caspian Sea Region 179
China is positioning itself to import large volumes of oil from the region as a result
of its efforts at increasing Sino-Iranian oil industry cooperation. In 1 997 China and Iran
reached an agreement whereby the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) will
construct a 1 ,000 km pipeline connecting Chinese and foreign oil concessions in the Caspian
Sea region to refineries in Iran. 180 Both countries also agreed to jointly develop Iran's
178Vahe Petrossian, "Iran Ready to Play Caspian Oil Game," MEED, 7 November 1997, 4-5.
179
Ibid.
,80The proposed pipeline would originate from Kazakhstan's Uzen oilfield, where China paid $1.3
billion for a 60 percent share. It is proposed to run through Turkmenistan to Iran's oil discharging port
facilities in the Persian Gulf for export to both China and Europe. Ibid.
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oil fields and China's oil refineries. 181
Chinese oil engineering companies have gained market share from Western
companies to supply Iran with oil industry equipment and services. In 1995, the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) moved the majority ofits overseas oil-related purchasing effort
from London to Beijing, where 40 percent of Iran's foreign purchases of oil equipment now
originate. 182 Tehran also recently lifted of restrictions on foreign oil companies to develop
Iran's onshore and offshore oil fields. This provides China with opportunities to jointly
develop Iran's oil resources, construct refineries and pipelines, and import oil and gas. 183
Iran represents a strategic transportation network in the region linking the Middle
East, Central Asia, Europe, Russia, and Asia. Iran's ports, railways, and roads also connect
the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, Caspian Sea, Black Sea, and Indian Ocean. China's
MSI is establishing bilateral ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL),
one of the largest MMFs in the region. 184 IRISL has bilateral shipping relationships with
Egypt, Kuwait, India, and Sri Lanka. The IRISL MMF operates between Iran and Australia,
Canada, China, East Africa, Europe, India, Japan, South Africa, and South America.
Sino-Iranian MSI is increasing due to Iran's desire to become more self sufficient in
18,This agreement was between CNPC and the National Iranian Oil Company. Ibid.
182Though China's oil industry equipment and engineering expertise is substandard by industry
standards, China has licenses to Western oil technology which it may have transferred to Iran. Vahe
Petrossian, "Iran Shops Around to Beat Sanctions," MEED, 18 July 1997, 15-16.
183A partial list ofNIOC s foreign concession offers of oil and gas resources includes: Darkhovin,
Shanul, Kuh-e-Mand, Shour, Mehr, Nierkabir, Hengam A, B, F and D, North Pars, South Pars, Fars
Province, Kopeh-Dagh, Esfandiar G, F, and A, B, and C near Abu Musa. "Iran: Oil and Gas Projects
Opened Up to Foreign Investors," MEED, 27 March 1998, 21.
,84
In 1996 IRISL had 75 ships with a total cargo capacity of 2,218,000 DWT. Two of IRISL's
subsidiaries, the Caspian Sea Shipping and the National Iranian Oil-Shipping Companies also operate in
the region. Tehran Times, "Iran to Become More Active in International Transport," 1 September 1996.
Online. Available HTTP:http://www.netiran.com/search.html, 24 April 1998.
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shipping its own exports and imports. Iran also wants to earn profits from carrying the trade
offoreign nations. Iran imports Chinese-manufactured industrial equipment and technology.
China MSI expansion strategy probably includes expanding its access to Iran's 1 5 major and
minor shipping ports to increase SFT within and without the region. The primary maritime
shipping ports in the Persian Gulf are depicted in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Maritime Shipping Ports in the Persian Gulf185
In 1994, Iran began a massive expansion program of its MMF by ordering 41 new
cargo ships to replace older ships in its inventory by 1998. 186 In 1995, Iran reportedly
ordered four Panamax-size cargo ships, each with a cargo capacity of22,600 DWT, and six
'"Lloyd's, 37.
mTehran Times, "41 New Ships to Joint IRSC In 2nd Plan," 8 March 1994. Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.netiran.com
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smaller multi-purpose cargo ships from China. 187 In 1996, two ofthese ships were delivered
to the Iranian port ofBandar Abbas. These ships, increasing Iran's MMF cargo capacity by
90,000 DWT, were reportedly built in China under the "supervision ofIranian engineers." 188
Levels of Sino-Iranian MSI cooperation are facilitated by the annual Iran-China Joint
Economic and Commercial Commission meetings held at each other's capitols during
alternate years. This commission has three committees focused on commerce and oil,
economy and industry, and science and technology. This commission provides China the
opportunity to invest in Iran's oil, gas, chemical, minerals, and metals production.
In conclusion, SFT and Chinese energy investment in the region increase China's
economic dependence on maritime shipping in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf,
and Indian Ocean. China's oil imports from the region are carried by oil tankers either
originating from ports on the Black Sea via the Mediterranean and Suez Canal routes or Iran
via the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean routes. Regarding China's future oil import demand
from the region, the Office ofNaval Intelligence states:
China will replace Japan as the region's number one oil importer. Oil exports
from the Arabian [Persian] Gulf are almost certainly going to be called upon
to supply much of China's growing demand for petroleum as the country's
high economic and energy consumption growth rates exceed the relatively
slower increases in domestic petroleum production. 189
^Tehran Times, "Iranian Vice-President Arrives in Beijing for Joint Commission," 25 May 1995.
Online. Available HTTP:http://www.netiran.com
188 Voice ofthe Islamic Republic (Tehran), "Chinese-made 22,600-ton Multi-purpose Ship Joins Fleet,'
FBIS, 30 August 1996. The ships Iran Mobin and Iran Makin were built in Shanghai and the Iran Matin
and Iran Yamin were built in Guanzhou. "Iran Mobin Lingers at Bandar Abbass," Tehran Times, 29
August 1996. Online. Available HTTP:http://www.netiran.com/search.html, 24 April 1998.
1890ffice of Naval Intelligence, August 1997, 62-63.
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C. AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
Levels of Sino-African trade are increasing due to the complimentary nature of
imports and exports each can provide the other. Both sides look to each other as export
markets with high potential for future growth. China's demand is high for Africa's large
quantities of energy and mineral resources. Africa's demand is high for China's
manufactured goods, technology, and capital investment.
The nature of China's foreign policy strategy towards Africa emphasizes bilateral
economic cooperation without political preconditions. During his two-week visit to six
African nations in 1996, President Jiang Zemin announced China's intention to open six
investment and trade offices in Africa and commit foreign aid in the region. His comments
during the visit exemplifies China's foreign policy when he stated:
China will firmly support the economic development in Africa and provide
government aid, as much as possible, without any additional political
conditions. China will increase its imports from Africa to promote a balanced
and quick development ofSino-Africa trade. 190 China, the biggest developing
country in the world, is ready to join hands with Africa, the world's biggest





As part of its foreign policy in the region to increase levels of bilateral economic
cooperation, China emphasizes its status as a "fellow developing nation." China also offers
economic management assistance based on publicizing the success of its own economy as
a model to be emulated. This strategy is exemplified by one Chinese journalist who stressed
I90
President Jiang Zemin in his Address to the Organization ofAfrican Unity in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
on 13 May 1996, cited in Zhao Quanfu, "Sino-African Friendship in Constant Progress," Beijing Review,
23 February- 1 March 1998, 10.
19,PRC Embassy (Washington D.C.), "Five-Point Proposal on Development of Sino-African
Friendship," Online. Available HTTP:http://www.china-embassy .org/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl?406, 17 April 1998.
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the potential for future increases in Sino-African economic cooperation:
China recognizes that African countries that depend on material exports are
restricted by an "unreasonable international economic order." The
combination of Chinese human resources and African natural resources,
along with the support offunds, can yield productive forces that promote the
economic development ofChina and Africa. China wants African economic
development to follow the Chinese trend of establishing a socialist market
system with enterprise at the core of economic activities. 192
In 1 996, the value of Sino-African trade was $4.03 billion, an increase of2.7 percent
over 1995. 193 In 1997, although Africa comprised just under 2 percent of China's total
foreign trade by region, China's exports to Africa increased by 25 percent. 194 In 1997,
Premier Li Peng, along with several senior Chinese diplomats, visited seven African
countries and signed more than 20 documents on economic cooperation. 195 In 1998, Vice
Premier and foreign minister Qian Qichen visited Morocco, Algeria, Malta, and Italy.
1. Overview of China's Regional Resource Dependencies
Beijing has targeted Sudan, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria as sources of oil imports
and South Africa, Congo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe for strategic minerals. South Africa has
large reserves of chromium, diamonds, gold, manganese, and platinum while Congo,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe have large reserves of copper and cobalt. 196 In 1997, China signed
$ 1 .73 billion worth ofnew resource and infrastructure contracts in Africa; an increase of 1 4.9
192Quanfu, 10.
193
In 1996, Africa comprised 1 .3 percent of China's total foreign trade. PRC Embassy (Washington),
"China Enhances Economic Ties With Africa," 16 February 1997. Online. Available




196These three nations, landlocked in the African interior, rely primarily on South Africa's ports to
export of their minerals via commercial shipping to China. Butts, 17. "Congo" refers to the "Democratic
Republic of Congo" (formerly Zaire).
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percent over 1996 and comprising 15 percent China's total value of foreign contracts. 197
Sudan is a major future source of African oil imports for China. China is increasing
its exports ofmanufactured technical equipment and providing capital investment to Sudan.
Over the past three years Sino-Sudanese trade has increased by an average annual rate of 1
percent with bilateral trade in 1997 totaling $124 million, an increase of 20 percent over
1996 bilateral trade totaling $100 million.
China's direct foreign investment for developing Sudan's oil industry influences the
Sudanese government to give China preferential economic incentives to attract further
Chinese investment. 198 In 1996, China's CNPC signed a $1 billion agreement with Sudan for
oil pipeline construction and a 40 percent share in Sudan' s Heglig oilfield. 199 This agreement
establishes CNPC as a major foreign partner in the Sudan Project Consortium (SPC).200 The
SPC is constructing new oil production facilities at Sudan's Mughlad Basin oilfield and a
1,400-1,600 KM pipeline from the oilfield to a new oil export terminal at Port Sudan. 201
Future increases in Sino-Sudanese economic interdependence will increase due to
support from Sudan's President Bashir. A Sudanese press report, describing a 1 998 meeting
between Sudan's president and China's assistant foreign minister in Khartoum, stated:
All relevant [Sudanese] authorities had been directed to support the Chinese
investment in the country. The Chinese minister affirmed that the Chinese
support to Sudan in international forums and economic fields, in the common
,97Wei.
l98According to Sudanese Finance Minister Irahim, "Chinese investments would be given more
privileges and exemptions within agreements." SUNA (Khartoum), "Sudanese Minister on Growing Trade
With China," FBIS, 24 February 1998.
'"Saywell and Rashid, 47.
200CNPC is also subcontracting portions of SPC's pipeline and oil terminal project to other Chinese oil
engineering firms. "Chinese Tipped For Pipeline Work," MEED, 2 January 1998, 25.
201
"Special Report: Oil and Gas," MEED,3\ October 1997, 36.
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interest, would continue. 202
In 1997, China imported 3.67 MT of oil from Angola; accounting for 1 1 percent of
Angola's total exports. 203 In 1 998, both nations signed a letter of intent for China to increase
Angolan oil imports and construct a oil refinery in Lobito City.204 Future oil extraction and
production cooperation between CNPC and Angola's National Angolan Fuel Company
(Sonangol) will result in more oil exports to China. 205
2. Case Study: Italy
China appears to be expanding its MSI' s presence in the Italian port ofNaples for two
strategic maritime economic purposes. One is to exert China's influence on Italy through
bilateral MSI cooperation to gain additional access to foreign oil imports. China expects to
use this influence to capitalize on Italy's extensive commercial relationships with foreign oil
and gas producers in Northern Africa and the Middle East.
Another purpose is to capture market share of handling foreign trade between ports
within and without the Mediterranean region. These ports include those located in the
Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Adriatic Sea, Black Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean
are depicted in Figure 9.
202Omdurman Republic ofSudan Radio Network (Khartoum), "Sudanese President, PRC Minister
Discus Cooperation," FBIS, 26 February 1998.
2mXinhua (Beijing), "Oil Official on Prospects for Sino-Angolan Cooperation," FBIS, 1 8 February
1998.
204The proposed refinery would be co-located with a recently discovered oilfield in central Angola with
an estimated annual production capacity of one million barrels. Ibid.
205Angolan Press Agency (Luanda), "Official Notes PRC's Willingness to Import More Oil," FBIS, 16
February 1998.
53
Figure 9. Ports in Northern Africa, Southern Europe, and the Middle East206
InNorthern Africa, Italian oil companies have oil and gas production agreements with
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Tunisia, while in the Middle East they include Iran, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia.207 In 1997, China's CNPC and Italy's Agip Corporation signed
agreements to jointly develop the oilfields offoreign nations in Northern Africa. China's oil
industry may soon target other Italian oil companies, having oil access relationships in
Africa, for joint oil production. One such firm is Italy's Enel Corporation which has an
agreement with Algeria's In Salah Gas to receive 4 billion cubic meters ofgas annually from
the District 3 oilfield in Central Algeria.
208 The route that this gas and other oil would be
20i
'Lloyd's, 9.
207Toby Ash, "Appetite For Things Italian On The Rise," MEED, 4 July 1997, 36.
208Charlotte Blum, "Gas Deals Signed for In Salah," MEED, 18 July 1997, 14.
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transported from Algeria to Italy is depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Oil and Gas Flows From Algeria to Italy209
In August 1 997, a Sino-Italian shipping service and port access agreement established
for COSCO a significant base of operations in Naples to expand its Mediterranean
services.210 As a result, COSCO will depend on Naples as its "Mediterranean Hub" for both
the direct and indirect transhipment of maritime cargo within and without the region.
COSCO's new presence in Naples was facilitated by Italy's recently revised port legislation
and shipping privatization reforms allowing foreign investment into Italy's MSI. COSCO
also gained optimal shipping services and terminal arrangement in Naples in exchange for
shifting its previous Mediterranean transhipment hub from Cyprus to Italy.
209
Ibid., 15.
2i0Xinhua (Beijing), "PRC Minister Visits Naples, COSCO's Future Base in Med," FBIS, 29 August
1997.
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COSCO's strategy for a maritime shipping network in the Mediterranean will use
Naples as a base linking it to the second most important port in the region, the Israeli port
ofHaifa. Italy benefits because China's MMF can transport Italian exports to Israel, Saudi
Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and Algeria. 211 COSCO also cooperates with Japan's K-
Line, Taiwan's Yang Ming, and to a limited extent with Israel's Zim Container Line, in the
Mediterranean and Northern Europe. In early 1998, Hong Kong-based OOCL, along with
its Grand Alliance partners, initiated joint services on the Asia-Mediterranean trades.
In 1997, COSCO also initiated transhipment services linking Haifa with the Turkish
port of Mersin. These services form a shipping network connecting Asia-Europe trade with
Asia-U.S. trade. The current level ofCOSCO's Haifa-Mersin service is low. However, it
has potential for COSCO to gain market share beyond Turkey into the Black Sea r. COSCO
is expected to expand its presence from Italy to Israel, where Tel Aviv has committed over
$1 billion to improving the infrastructure of the ports of Haifa and Ashdod. 212
COSCO's future level operations in the Mediterranean can be expected to increase
as a result of China's influence on Naples to expand its port terminals and dredge its harbor
to a deeper depth.213 In January 1998, COSCO extended its bid for a majority share in one
ofItaly's largest shipping companies, Lloyd Triestino.214 If it wins this bid, COSCO will be
able to handle more cargo between Central European ports via the Adriatic Sea. China's
CSC has indicated its intentions to increase its market share of handling oil for foreign
21
'Ash, 27.
212Debra Rubin, Stephen Daniels, and David Rosenbaum, "There's a Project in Every Port,'
Engineering News-Record, 10 November 1997, 25.
213Angelo Scorza, "Competition Close to Home," Cargo Systems, February 1998, 50-51.
214
" Italian Container Lines For Sale," Cargo Systems, February 1998, 22.
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nations in Europe and the Mediterranean. 215 CSC can be expected to utilize Naples,
alongside COSCO, as its primary a transhipment hub port in the region.
As a result, China's direct investment in and Sino-foreign joint production of oil and
gas in Africa will cause China's oil import dependencies in Northern Africa to increase.
China will increase the level of dependence on foreign shipping companies for contracting
their oil tankers and China's MMF to import African oil and gas from the region. Therefore,
there will be increasing volumes ofmaritime shipping carrying oil and gas destined for China
in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.
D. FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES: LATIN AMERICA
Since 1996, China's diplomatic strategy in Latin America has been successful at
increasing levels of bilateral economic cooperation. In 1996, the value of Sino-Latin
American bilateral trade exceeded $6 billion, an increase of 12.6 percent over 1995.216 In
1996, China's strategy to expand bilateral trade with the region is summarized by Chinese
Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen:
China and Latin America, with their complementary economies, should
strengthen their economic trade and technological cooperation. China and
Latin American countries are all developing nations, and have the same
development plans and good bases ofcooperation. Although geographically
fare apart, exchanges ofhigh-level visits between China and Latin American
have been frequent.217
In 1997, China's President Jiang Zemin and a large delegation of Chinese
government trade officials visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and
215
"COSCO Will Retain top Place in Cross-Trade Bulk Sector," Lloyd's List, 6 October 1998, 2.
216PRC Embassy (Washington), "Potential Relations Between China and Latin America," 16 February




Peru. Government and business leaders from Bolivia, Uruguay, Bahamas, Antigua and
Barbuda, and Cuba visited China. In 1997, China signed $184 million worth of foreign
construction projects in Latin America and double the amount reached in 1996. 218
While Latin America comprises less than two percent of China's total foreign trade
volume, Beijing's economic strategy to increase bilateral trade is exemplified by one senior
Chinese official who stated:
China and Latin America can become major cooperative partners in the fields
of agriculture, animal husbandry, mineral products, as well as exploration of
energy resources and land. Problems still exist, blocking the development of
bilateral economic and trade relations. China may consider signing bilateral
and multilateral free trade agreements or economic supplementary
agreements with Latin American economic groups. The governmental and
non-governmental bodies can play amore positive role in setting up financial,
economic and trade representative offices and encourage investment in each
other's countries.219
The expansion of Sino-Latin American trade probably enhances Beijing's ability to
gain political support from the region. In 1 997, Colombia, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador,
Mexico, Uruguay, and the Republic of Dominica supported China's position on the UN
Human Rights Committee on Human Rights and Tibet. Regarding China's political support
to Latin-America, a senior Chinese official from the China Institute ofModern International
Relations (CIMIR) stated that Chinahad "supported the struggle ofLatin American countries
for economic and social development and against foreign intervention" and "supported
Peru's acceptance as a new member of Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC)."220
218Wei.
219Xinsheng, 10-12.
220This official is the Director of the Latin American Section at CIMIR. Zhang Xinsheng, "Sino-Latin
American Cooperation Faces Wide Vista," Beijing Review, 23 February- 1 March 1998, 10.
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SFT in the region involves production and trade in oil, minerals, industrial goods,
agriculture, and animal products. China's resource import dependencies in the region are
primarily with Venezuela, Mexico, and Peru. 221 In 1 997, China and Venezuela signed a 20-
year contract whereby CNPC invested $240 million to operate an existing oilfield and $358
million in two other oil fields forjoint exploration and development with Venezuela.222 This
agreement was subsequent to a previous oil cooperation agreement reached during Chinese
President Li Peng's visit to Caracas in 1996.223
In February 1998, China received 60,000 tons of oil that was carried by a ship from
Peru. The significance of this shipment was that it was the first from a Chinese-owned oil
field in a foreign country. 224 The oil came from Peru's Talara Block oilfield where China
bought concessions in 1993. In the future, China can be expected to rely on Venezuela as
long-term source of oil imports from Latin America since that nation's oil reserves are
estimated at 10.15 billion tons.225 China can also be expected to increase its oil and
manganese imports from Mexico and iron ore imports from Argentina, Peru, and Brazil.226
In 1996, China and Panama established bilateral trade offices in each other's capital
cities. In February 1997, China and Panama signed a 25-year MSI cooperation agreement
whereby the Hong Kong-based HPH and COSCO will operate portions ofports on both ends
221China can be expected to increase its imports of copper from Chile; iron ore from Brazil; tin from
Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru; manganese from Brazil; and silver from Mexico, Peru, and Chile.
222The two oilfields, Caracoles block and Intercampo Norte, though considered by industry standards
as marginal, have estimated reserves of 100 MT. "CNPC's Recent Gas Deals," Fairplay, 29 January 1998,
28.
223CNPC outbid over 90 other competing oil companies. Xinhua (Beijing), "Oil Corporation Wins Bid
for Exploration in Venezuela," FBIS, 15 October 1997.




In 1992, China purchased its first iron mine in Peru. Drewry, 28.
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of the Panama Canal.227 The two ports, Cristobal on the Atlantic and Balboa on the Pacific
side, are depicted in Figure 1
1
.
Figure 11. The Panama Canal228
As a result, these ports are expected to receive significant increases in COSCO's
handling of container traffic between Asia, North America, and Latin America. The
international port and shipping relationships ofHPH and COSCO will be used to increase
Chinese trade between Asia and Latin America through linkages with the Panama Canal.




China will also receive foreign exchange through the income earned by HPH and COSCO
as a result of charging foreign shipping companies for the use of these terminals.
While China is the third largest user ofthe Panama Canal behind the U.S. and Japan,
Beijing aggressively outbid several international companies for Balboa and Cristobal, in part
to decrease the influence ofTaiwan's presence in the region. 229 COSCO's increased market
share in handling trade between Asia, Latin America, and North America has contributed to
a decrease in Taiwan's shipping volume through the Panama Canal from 8 percent in 1991
to 4.8 percent in 1996.230
229Measured by total tonnage, China is the fifth largest, while Taiwan is the ninth largest maritime
shipping nation using the Panama Canal, cited in Larry Rohter, "Heavy Hand of Beijing Dampens a





VI. IMPACT ON CHINA'S MARITIME SECURITY POLICY
What merits our special attention is the increase in the world's population and the ongoing
trend of tighter supplies of natural resources.
PLA Major General Zheng Qinsheng, Military Conflicts in the New Era, 1996
We also need to act according to the rights and interests granted by the treaty as to sea space
beyond national jurisdiction such as the high seas, moving our naval might beyond our
borders, to defend our interests beyond our national territory.
PLAN Senior Colonel Liu Zhenhuan,
Impact ofUNLaw ofthe Sea on China 's Maritime Rights and Interests, 1996
China's economic dependence on shipping and trade influences Beijing's perceptions
of the nation's potential vulnerabilities. Some Chinese political and military leaders argue
that protection of China's maritime economic interests should be emphasized more in
China's national security policy. Statements of these leaders indicate such an emphasis
would require naval protection of China's maritime dependencies beyond territorial waters.
This chapter examines the impact of China's regional MSI and SFT network
dependencies on China's maritime security policy. It assesses the potential for the People's
Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) to protect China's maritime shipping network dependencies
that are outside China's territorial waters. This chapter also offers an analysis of the
potential for PLAN access to foreign ports based on levels of MSI and SFT relationships.
A. VULNERABILITIES OF CHINA'S MARITIME SHIPPING
Specific transnational threats to the security ofChina'sMMF include hostile foreign
navies, piracy, and terrorism. Increased reporting of these incidents influences Beijing's
perceptions that China's MMF is vulnerable in international waters that are beyond the
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PLAN'S current operating areas and capabilities. These perceptions may motivate China to
modify its maritime security doctrine and strengthen the capability of the PLAN to protect
China's maritime shipping dependencies in international waters.
1. Foreign Naval Threats
Beijing probably perceives that China's MSI is vulnerable to interdiction by the
expanding naval capabilities ofthe United States, Japan, and ASEAN. Moreover, Beijing's
assessment ofChina's strategic maritime economic vulnerabilities must recognize that major
foreign powers may choose to impose maritime economic sanctions against China. Ifforeign
nations choose to punish China, their navies can enforce sanctions or blockades against
China's MMF in international waters.
Incidents involving the "harassment" ofChina'sMMF in international waters reveal
the impotency of the PLAN and its inability to protect China's MMF as compared to the
navies ofother large and medium powers. In 1993, USN combatants detained, boarded, and
inspected a Chinese merchant ship suspected of carrying chemicals prohibited by UN
sanctions in the Persian Gulf. 231
In 1997 the USS Nicholson boarded the Chinese oiler, Hai Gong You, suspected of
illegally exporting Iraqi oil to Bahrain. 232 As a result ofthese incidents and naval expansion
by foreign nations, two senior Chinese naval officers commented:
So certain medium and small coastal countries are shifting their defense
231Karen Gullo and John Solomon, "Chinese to Lease Historic U.S. Port," The Washington Times, 10
March 1997, 1.
232Following the boarding, the USS Nicholson, together with the USS Cowpens and USS Cushing,
escorted the Hai Gong You to Bahrain. Dale Eisman, "Navy Faces Low-Tech, High Risk Adversaries,"
The Virginian-Pilot, 12 November 1997, 1.
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policy priority to their coastal waters, devising strategies to defend and
contend for more maritime rights and interests, even not hesitating to make
brutal attacks. This has turned the oceans per se into the new high ground of
international strategic competition. To seize more maritime rights and
interests, all coastal countries are adjusting their maritime strategies [and]
sharply developing their naval might, upgrading their naval operating
equipment, intensifying their military deployments, and holding frequent
naval exercises. The struggles among the pertinent countries to control these
crucial sea lanes are growing ever sharper. So the rivalry over sea lanes
remains a key part ofthe international rivalry in maritime strategy. The Asia-
Pacific region will become one of the priority regions of maritime strategic
competition.
China perceives potential threats from ASEAN navies because of publicity
surrounding their naval modernization plans. In 1996, these plans included spending $85
billion between 1997-2007 on 1 7 destroyers, 70 frigates, 25 corvettes, and 45 submarines.234
Most Western security analysts conclude that threats to China's MMF from foreign navies
is low, as indicated by the following statement:
It should be noted that with the possible exception ofChina, whose long-term
plans include the creation of a blue water navy ... no other Asian state's
armed forces current modernization is bent on power projection beyond its
EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone]. None anticipates developing a sea control
capability in the vast Pacific. 235
China probably views with suspicion, potential threats to its maritime economic
security, posed by maritime security and naval relationships between the United States and
Japan. Japan's maritime security strategy allows its navy to protect maritime shipping out
to 1,000 NM from Japan. China perceives naval cooperation between the U.S. and Japan
233Senior Colonels Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, "On Maritime Strategy and the Marine
Environment," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), FBIS, 20 May 1997, 81-92.
234
"Building Peace in the Asia-Pacific in 1997," Asian Defence Journal, February 1997, 1.
235Sheldon W. Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific," Pacific Affairs, Fall 1996,
391.
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could threaten China's MMF in the event of sanctions against China.
Beijing also views with suspicion potential threats from other Asian and Western
navies which conduct routine bilateral naval exercises in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN
navies routinely conduct joint naval patrols to protect merchant shipping from piracy in the
SCS and Strait of Malacca. Beijing's perceptions of threats from other Asian navies in the
region is illustrated by two Chinese maritime security scholars who wrote:
Among the maritime countries on China's periphery, Japan's military
expenditures are the largest, (next only to the U.S., ranking 3 rd in the world.)
Japan adopts the policy ofattaching great importance to developing its navy.
In the 1 990's, the Korean Navy has concluded its first, oceangoing voyage to
Europe to familiarize itselfwith the oceangoing route and enhance its ability
to make oceangoing voyages . . . and in recent years, the Korean Navy has
also repeatedly sent out fleets to participate in the "Pacific Rim" exercises
aimed at enhancing its ability to fight in waters far away from Korea.236
2. Piracy and Terrorism
China's MMF is vulnerable to piracy and terrorism while transiting international
SLOCs and in or near ports in developing regions. Between 1991-1993, piracy in the East
China Sea (ECS) and SCS accounted for over 50 percent of piracy incidents reported
worldwide.237 However, based on the number of piracy and terrorist attacks, compared to
their negative impact on the overall level of SFT and maritime shipping in general, these
threats have little effect on China's economy at present.
Although threats to maritime shipping near Africa's littoral regions have decreased,
low levels of piracy do occur along shipping routes near Angola, Mozambique, Namibia,
236
Li Jie and Song Tao, "Continued Naval Developments in Nations on China's Periphery," Bingqi
Zhishi {Ordnance Knowledge), FBIS, 12 May 1997, 17-20.
237
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Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia. In littoral regions ofLatin America, low levels ofpiracy occur near
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Colombia. However, increased reporting of piracy and
terrorist attacks against maritime shipping worldwide probably increases China's sensitivities
to these types of threats to China's MSI dependence. Between 1992-1996, the number of
reported piracy and terrorist attacks against maritime shipping have increased, as shown by






Figure 12. Worldwide Maritime Piracy
Attacks, 1992-1996.238
Figure 13. Worldwide Maritime Terrorist
Attacks, 1992-1996.239
During Fall 1 997, five foreign merchant ships, including one Chinese bulk carrier and
two Singaporean-flagged oil tankers, were robbed or attacked in the SCS or Andaman Sea.240
The Chinese merchant ship, Cordiality,was seriously damaged and five Chinese crewmen
were killed allegedly by Sri Lankan terrorists offshore near the port of Trincomalee, Sri
Lanka. 241 Soon after this attack, representatives from China's Foreign Ministry and COSCO




"WorIdwide Threat to Shipping," Office ofNaval Intelligence, 3 December 1997.
241 Xinhua (Beijing), "Reports On Ship Attack in Sri Lanka." FBIS, 1 1 September 1997.
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arrived in Colombo to assess the damage and care for the ship's crew.
B. EVOLVING MARITIME SECURITY POLICY
Actual and perceived threats to China's MMF dependencies are causal factors for
Beijing to reevaluate the effectiveness ofChina's current strategic maritime security policy.
Beijing's desire to protect these dependencies would result in expanding the PLAN'S
presence beyond China's territorial waters to protect maritime shipping interests. China
regards its MMF as "sovereign" property as indicated by one Chinese officer who stated:
Sovereignty includes domestic and foreign aspects, and the two are
interdependent and can not be separated. The exercise ofnational sovereignty
is not limited to the territory .... National ocean rights are not limited to
territorial waters. The national defense should safeguard not only the
national security interest, but also especially national economic development
interests, including . . . overseas investment, international trade, etc.242
China's economic dependencies on its MMF, foreign trade, and access to strategic
resources are important factors that influence Beijing's maritime security policy. One
Chinese scholar summarized this influence:
Beijing's security strategy after the Cold War is redefined by its domestic
priorities and growing foreign economic relations .... China's growing
economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to
economic interests and security .... Economic interests have become more
important in defining China's national security agenda, because the Chinese
leadership now views them as the means and ends for national security.243
1. Maritime Economic Security Strategy
Due to a purposeful lack oftransparency on Beijing's part, little is known outside of
242Colonel Fang Ning, "Defense Policy in the New Era," China Military Science, Winter 1994, cited in
Pillsbury, 45-47.
243Weixing Hu, "China's Security Agenda After the Cold War," The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No.l,
1995, 117-121.
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Chinese military circles as to exactly what comprises Beijing' s maritime security strategy and
policy. Debates among Western security analysts regarding this policy have resulted in no
clear consensus as to what factors influence Beijing to deploy the PLAN in international
waters. Similarly, there are undoubtedly debates among China's civilian and military policy
makers as to what defines China's maritime economic security strategy.
Some Western security analysts argue that China's maritime security policy and naval
capabilities confine the PLAN to operations within China's "territorial" waters.244 One
analyst infers that such a policy precludes the PLAN from protecting China's MMF in
international waters:
The forward deployment offorces outside ofchina and "out of area" missions
are not compatible with China's military experiences or culture. The
arguments within the PLA for a blue-water capability have not convinced the
CMC to allocate the resources to implement such a capability.245
Other analysts note that China's maritime security strategy offers a wide range of
possibilities for extending the PLAN'S presence in international waters by stating: "China's
naval military doctrine has shifted from the coastal defense ofthe mainland to active defense
of maritime economic and strategic interests"246 and "It [the PLAN] has now adopted the
Mahanian concepts ofpower projection and sea control."247 Similarly, others highlight that
China perceives the need for a maritime strategy for the PLAN that comprises a "three phase
244Such operations in China's "territorial" waters for the PLAN include protecting China's MSI;
maintaining a sea denial capability in a Taiwan scenario against the navies of the United States, Japan, and
Taiwan; and protecting China's territorial claims in the SCS. For the purposes of this section, China's
claims to the disputed Spratly Islands in the SCS are considered as within China's "territorial" waters.
245
Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region Through 2010, (Alexandria:
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245Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," Current History, September 1997, 247.
247
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strategy designed to advance the nation's maritime strength from coastal defense, to regional
and perhaps global capability built around aircraft carrier battle groups by the year 2050."248
This section analyzes the potential ofChina's dependence on its domestic and foreign
MSI interests, as a rationale for China to extend its naval presence unilaterally or initiate
bilateral naval cooperation. Such a presence would extend to international sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) beyond China's territorial waters for purposes not necessarily
threatening to civilian or military shipping. This presence would also likely extend to foreign
"hub ports"249 where China's MSI has a large presence in nations where levels of SFT are
high. This rationale is illustrated by one Chinese security analyst who wrote:
A blue-water navy must respond to the needs ofthe national strategy and the
national defense strategy. The PRC merchant marine fleet sails to over 600
ports in over 150 countries. China can only follow the world trend by
moving farther and farther out to sea to conduct operations in blue water. .
.
inexorably China's naval defense strategy moves toward blue water,
ultimately the Chinese Navy will be a blue-water navy. 250
The basis for this argument is that PLAN deployments to protect China's maritime
shipping dependencies are ofprimary importance to China's economic growth and stability.
China's use of this rationale also removes the political and security stigmas associated with
248
Dr. Bernard D. Cole, "The Persistence of Conventional Military Power in a Maritime Theater: The
Asia Pacific, 1997," Speech at the 1997 Pacific Symposium, Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Cooperation and Conflict, 28 April 1997.
249The term "hub ports" refers to those international ports possessing robust infrastructures with
capacities for loading and unloading large volumes of ships and cargo with great efficiency and large
economies of scale. As a result, "hub ports" can be considered strategic in the context of maritime
economics. Daniel Y. Coulter, a maritime economic security analyst with the Office of Naval Intelligence,
has argued that "hub ports" are of greater strategic importance than SLOC choke points (SCP) to
economies of a region due to the value of trade they can handle and that maritime shipping can divert to
other ports with similar infrastructures. He further argues that the costs associated with diversions of
maritime shipping in the event of SCP closures would be negligible compared to the overall value of trade
between suppliers and recipients. Author's Interview with Daniel Y. Coulter, 5 May 1998.
250Zhang Wei, "Ultimately Moving Toward Blue Water," Jianchuan Zhi Shi, FBIS, 1 January 1997, 8-
9.
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international naval deployments based on power projection or territorial seizure. The
probabilities for successful Sino-foreign naval cooperation, albeit limited in size and scope,
would be enhanced through a rationale based on mutual maritime shipping security concerns.
Admiral Liu Huaqing, the seniorPLAN officer between 1 982-1 988, was responsible
for modernizing the PLAN and developing China's maritime security strategy in the 1980's.
His efforts to modernize the PLAN for protecting China's maritime economic interests is
reflected in his statement:
The further expansion of offshore energy resource recovery capabilities and
merchant and fishing fleet activities, to let China obtain the necessary foreign
currency reserves for its modernization plan, will undoubtedly increase the
requirement for more warships to protect those interests.251
In 1989, PLAN Deputy Commander Zhang Xusan publicized the evolution of the
PLAN'S "coastal defense" (jinhai fangu) strategy to an "offshore defense" (jinyang fangyu)
strategy.
252 This new strategy gave the PLAN responsibility for protecting China's MMF in
sea lanes extending from China's coastline to 200 NM, the boundary of China's EEZ.
Subsequently in 1992, this strategy evolved into an "active offshore defense strategy" with
its goal by 2000 being for the PLAN to be capable of protecting China's MMF seaward to
the "First Island Chain;" extending from north of the Kuriles along Japan, through Taiwan,
the Philippines, and Indonesia to the SCS. By 2020, this capability would extend to the
"Second Island Chain;" which extends to Guam, the Marianas, and the Carolines.253
251Cited in LCDR Bradley Hahn, USNR (ret.), "Hai Fang," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March
1986, 120.
252Chong-Pin Lin, "Red Fist, China's Army in Transition," International Defense Review, 1 February
1995, 34.
253John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 March 1996,
130.
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nations. UNCLOS III provides the PLAN with internationally recognized legal rights of
"innocent passage, right of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, high seas
freedom and sovereign immunity of warships and other public vessels and aircraft."261
3. PLAN Capabilities and Potential For Foreign Port Access
Currently, PLAN combatants do not possess the capabilities for sustaining a presence
to protect China's MMF in SLOCs beyond China's territorial waters. However, from a
Chinese perspective, success for the PLAN would not necessarily be measured by its ability
to maintain a sustained presence. Rather, success would be measured by the PLAN'S ability
to maintain an occasional presence.
In this context, an occasional presence by the PLAN in international SLOCs would
not guarantee deterrence from threats to China's maritime shipping. However, by using
protection of China's MMF as a pretext, Beijing would be more successful in justifying to
the international community a PLAN extended presence beyond China's territorial waters.
Between March-April 1997, the PLAN conducted two unprecedented international
peacetime deployments of combatants for port visits in seven foreign countries. These
deployments consisted of two separate groups, each comprising two combatants and one
auxiliary oiler. One group conducted the first ever PLAN port visits to the U.S. mainland,
Mexico, Peru, and Chile.262 Another group conducted the first ever sequential port visits in
Southeast Asia to Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 263 During May 1 998, three PLAN
26,Cited in CAPT George Galdorisi, USN, "It's Time To Sign On," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
January 1998,51-53.
262Susan Kreifels, "Chinese Navy Ships, on Unusual Tour, Make Call at Pearl Harbor," The
Washington Post, 10 March 1997, 9.
263Dan Wu and Daluo Jia, China News Digest, 30 March 1997.
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ships visited Australia and New Zealand for the first time.264
One purpose ofthese "goodwill" port visits was to further Sino-foreign political and
military transparency. Another purpose was to "promote friendship" with countries where
China seeks to increase levels of SFT. Still another purpose was to train PLAN crews in
long-range navigation and seamanship proficiency in a "blue water" environment. The
PLAN would require such proficiency to protect China's MMF in international waters.
The international deployments conducted by the PLAN during 1 997- 1 998, may have
illustrated Beijing's desire to demonstrate the PLAN'S capabilities for extending its presence
in international waters. Such an incremental extension the PLAN'S geographical presence
would be consistent with the evolution ofChina's maritime strategy from a "coastal defense"
strategy to an expanded and more encompassing "offshore active defense" strategy.
Some PLAN combatants have the minimal necessary capabilities to sail between
ports from Asia to the Middle East and Africa. The PLAN'S ability to sail long distances
would be enhanced by access to foreign ports for repair, refuel, and replenishment. The
PLAN'S most capable ships have ranges of between 4,000-5,000 NM. These capabilities
would enable PLAN ships, deploying from the PLAN'S South Sea Fleet naval base at
Zhangjiang, to reach foreign ports in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf.
Foreign ports located within 2,000 NM from Zhangjiang include those in the
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei; within 2,000-3,000NM
264The three PLAN ships, the Luhu Class guided missile destroyer Qingdao, training ship Shichang,
and replenishment ship Nancang, visited Auckland from 27-30 April and Sydney from 4-7 May. These
ships subsequently conducted a port visit to Manila, the Philippines 1 8-21 May 1998. Zhang Zhao and
Jiang Guocheng, "PRC Naval Fleet Ends Australia Visit," Xinhua (Beijing), FBIS, 7 May 1998.
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include Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; and within 4,000-6,000NM include Australia,
Pakistan, Iran, Kenya, and South Africa. These nations are depicted in Figure 14. In 1997,
the PLAN'S round trip voyages from China to the SCS totaled 7,000 NM, while the voyages
to North and South America totaled over 20,000 NM. Between April-May 1998, the three
PLAN ships that visited Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, conducted a 48-day
voyage and sailed over 12,700 NM.265
QTENRAN
==** s—
V^T' ycrnvaStiffi STRIKE \ '
^^FffifiT IRAN
^.TJLd* ARABIA - •. ^,
AFGHANISTAN / e'S^o?*1
SUDA1 MA UtN. **«J«e __
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An extended PLAN presence could be used to initiate Sino-foreign naval cooperation
for protecting mutual shipping interests. One senior PLA officer noted:
In a bilateral process, both sides can explore areas of common ground in
depth, and increase a certain measure oftransparency in areas such as military
development, troop deployments, and military exercises, so as to enhance
mutual trust and understanding. Therefore, China has taken a positive
attitude toward military to military contacts and cooperation with Asia-
Pacific countries. Clearly, China cannot develop its economy and safeguard
its security without cooperating with other Asia-Pacific countries.267
In 1998, the PLAN appears to be positioning itself for future Sino-foreign naval
cooperation by first "showing the flag" and visiting foreign navies in their nations' ports. In
April 1998, Rear Admiral Han Fangyun, Commander of the PLAN ship group visiting
Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines and Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN North
Sea Fleet, stated these visits would "play a positive role in improving the friendship and
exchanges between the Chinese armed forces and the armed forces ofthe three countries in
the region."268 During the PLAN port visit in New Zealand he stated "the visit is aimed to
increase the understanding, exchanges and friendship between the militaries of China and
New Zealand, and enable the militaries of the two countries to learn from each other."269
During the PLAN port visit in Australia he stated:
This [port visit] has added a new chapter to the friendly exchange between
the Chinese Navy and the Oceanian countries, peoples, and armed forces and
especially navies. The current visit has brought friendly ties between the
Chinese Navy and the navies ofNew Zealand and Australia to a new stage of
development. Through extensive exchanges, Chinese naval officers and men
have gained first-hand knowledge of foreign navies' advanced equipment,
267PLA Senior Colonel Ding Bangquan, China 's Strategic Conceptsfor Asia-Pacific Security,
(Beijing: PLA National Defense University, 1994)
268Zhao, 9 April 1998.
269Xinhua (Beijing), "Chinese Naval Ships Start Visit to New Zealand," FBIS, 27 April 1998.
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education, training, and troop management, resulting in the broadening of
their vision. The visit has expanded China's influence and provided an
opportunity for people to observe the Chinese Navy's image as a peace-
loving, mighty, and civilized force.270
India is the most apprehensive nation regarding potential PLAN presence in the
Indian Ocean. The PLAN has not entered the region since conducting port visits in Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh in 1985.271 Indian journalists reflect New Delhi's concerns that
China's oil dependencies in the Middle East will cause the PLAN to expand its presence in
the region by gaining port access in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Africa.272 The
geographic proximity of India to Bangladesh and Myanmar is depicted in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. The Boundaries Between India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar-273
270Zhang Zhao and Yang Minqing, "PRC Naval Ship Commander Interviewed in Sydney," Xinhua
(Hong Kong), FBIS, 6 May 1998.
"'Since 1985, no less than 16 PLAN ships have made port visits to 13 foreign ports. Xinhua (Beijing),
"Navy Fleet Makes Port Calls," FBIS, 24 June 1997.




India probably views that China's ties to Myanmar will eventually result in the PLAN
using Myanmar' s naval facilities to support a PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean to protect
China's MMF. One Indian security analyst commented that since 1993, over 70 Chinese
naval and engineering personnel have been improving Myanmar' s naval facilities at
Hainggyi, Akyab, and Mergui. 274 Unconfirmed press reporting indicates China has been
assisting Myanmar in constructing a naval facility on Hainggyi Island 275 and maritime
surveillance facilities on Great Coco, Hainggyi, Monkey Point, Zadetkyi Kyun, and Ramree
Islands near the Andaman Sea.276 The locations ofthese facilities are depicted in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Maritime Surveillance Facilities in Myanmar"277
274
Rahul Ray-Choudhury, "Trends in Naval Power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean During the Past
Year," SAPRA India Monthly Bulletin, January 1996. Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/96jan/siO 19603.html
275Mohan Malik, "Burma Slides Under China's Shadow," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1997, 320-
322.
276Desmond Ball, "SIGINT Strengths Form a Vital Part of Burma's Military Muscle," Jane's




India probably views that increases in China's MSI relationships with Pakistan and
Iran will expand from strictly commercial to include naval cooperation. Pakistan is
expanding its port ofGwadar, near the Iranian-Pakistani border, into a commercial port and
naval base with an adjacent airfield.278 In February 1998, China reportedly offered loans to
Pakistan for purchasing naval combatants for the Pakistani Navy to be built in both China
and Pakistan. This offer was made during Pakistani Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih
Bukhari's visit to Beijing during February 1998. During that trip, he visited Chinese naval
bases and discussed "increased cooperation between navies of the two nations."279
In conclusion, China's economic dependence on its MMF for growth and stability
encourages Beijing to modify its maritime security policy to allow the PLAN to maintain an
occasional presence in international SLOCs. It is the PLAN'S current lack of "blue-water"
experience that motivates the PLAN to embark on such missions. The current capabilities
ofPLAN combatants allow for only limited protection of China's MMF beyond territorial
waters. As Chinese naval modernization efforts yield more capable ships, a younger
generation of PLAN officers is more likely to support and execute protection of China's
MMF in international SLOCs. However, the general consensus among Western analysts is
that the PLAN will not have the capabilities to maintain a continuous presence in
international SLOCs until between 2020-2050.280
278
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In the future, the United States will have to deal more effectively with China's changing
status in Asia and the world, especially with the military dimension.
Former U.S. Ambassador to China, James Lilley
The build-up of China's defense is not directed at any country and will not be a threat to any
country. Any military buildup would be within the larger context of China's goal of
economic development.
China's Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian,
Speech before the Japanese Defense Research Institute in Tokyo, 1998
A primary role ofnaval power in the 2
1
st
century will be to help guarantee economic stability
as international trade, commerce, and the "resources of the sea" continue to grow...the
world's navies must be at the forefront in guaranteeing the free flow ofgoods and materials.
Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral Johnson,
Address to the 1997 International Seapower Symposium
China's economic expansion strategy depends on regional networks linking SFT with
China's MSI to earn profits and import vital strategic resources. These networks are
expanding due to China's foreign policy, overseas investment, Sino-foreign shipping and
port development cooperation, and market share in international shipping. These networks
enhance Beijing's ability to further China's strategic economic, political, and security
interests. Beijing's perceptions of threats to these networks increases the potential for the
Chinese Navy to protect China's MMF in international waters.
A. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
1. Impact on the International Maritime Shipping Industry
China's MSI is positioning itself to gain further market share of maritime shipping
and handling energy, industrial, and food commodities between Asia, Africa, Europe, the
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Middle East, and Latin America. The advantages of large numbers of smaller-sized ships
make China's MMF well suited for handling the foreign trade of developing nations in
littoral areas. China appears willing to commit itsMMF to less profitable container shipping
services for developing nations in order to gain long-term market share. China's MSI can
also be expected to increase its market share in the Intra-Asia, Asia-North America, and
Asia-Europe trades as illustrated by Figure 17.
Figure 17. Major World Maritime Shipping and Trade Concentration Areas281
COSCO's fleet of over 150 container ships and 250,000 TEU handling capacity is
expected implement a major expansion plan in 2000 which could make it the largest
container shipper of the world's maritime trades by 201 0.282 With the exception of India,
China's MSI expansion strategy will increase China's MMF's presence in foreign ports in
the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Africa that are depicted in Figure 18.
COSCO's primary international shipping trades are depicted in Appendix A.
28l Ross Robinson, "Asian Hub/Feeder Nets: The Dynamics of Restructuring," Maritime Policy &
Management, January-March 1998. 23.
282
Lloyd's List, 6 October 1998, 2.
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Figure 18. Ports in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Western Pacific283
The creation ofthe Shanghai Shipping Exchange (SSE) will increase China's ability
to determine maritime shipping schedules, sailing frequencies, port calls, shipping rates,
types of service, and container prices and distribution in Asia. The SSE requires foreign
shippers to file their tariff and service rates for approval prior to shipping cargo. China's
MSI, exempt from doing so, is able to view these rates and lower prices to gain market share
from foreign shipping companies. The SSE sets shipping rates for foreign shippers handling
trade between China and Asia. In the future, rates between China and Europe may also
affected.284 Foreign shipping companies failing to join SSE and abide by its rules are subject
to denial of services in China's ports.
283Stopford, 279.
284SISC's regulations do not apply to U.S.-China shipping services and rates. Philip Damas, "China
Rules," American Shipper, February 1997, 44.
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China's MMF is increasing in size and handling capacity for transporting larger
volumes cargo to improve its competitiveness. As the size, capacity, and foreign port access
for China's MMF expands, foreign shipping companies are motivated to encourage China's
MMF to join their alliances. This would increase profits for all parties involved due to
reduced operating costs, expanded services, and increased efficiency. However, China's
MMF expansion will probably not meet China's import and export requirements. China will
depend more on foreign MMFs to handle SFT as China's industrial production increases and
China's ports open further to foreign-flagged shipping. By 2006-2016, the size of China's
MMF is expected to rival that of Japan and be the largest MMF in the world. 285
China's strategy for capturing world shipping service market share is to expand its
influence and cooperation with Asian shipping companies. Asia's shipping lines comprise
seven of the world's top ten shipping companies, while Western shipping companies
comprise three.286 Asian shipping lines carry over 80 percent ofcontainerized cargo on Asia-
U.S. routes, 70 percent of Asia-Europe routes, and 90 percent of intra-Asia routes.287
Between 1970-2000, China's MSI expansion is creating robust shipping linkages between
China and foreign ports in Asia as depicted in Figure 19. This strategy will continue to be
successful if Western shipping firms continue to lose market share to Asian shipping firms.
285Author's interview with Daniel Y. Coulter, Office of Naval Intelligence, 6 May 1998.
286The three Western firms are Maersk, P&O Nedlloyd, and Sea-Land. S. C. Chan, "Asian Carriers
Rule the Waves," Cargonews Asia, 17 November 1997. Online. Available
HTTP:http://www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews. 13 April 1998.
287These include Evergreen, OOCL, COSCO, NYK, Milsui OSK Lines, NOL, Hanjin, Hyundai, Wan
Hai and Uniglory. Ibid.
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Figure 19. Development of Asia's Maritime Shipping Networks, 1970-2000288
At present, China's MSI specializes in building merchant ships for export that are
below 100,000 DWT for developing countries. It has acquired advanced shipping design,
marine engine, and shipbuilding engineering technology from Japan and South Korea. This
will allow it to build larger and more capable ships for increasing its international
shipbuilding market share of double-hulled crude oil tankers and LPG/LNG gas carriers.
Due to China's lower labor and resource costs, foreign shipbuilding companies can be
expected to continue relocating portions of their production to China to earn higher profits.
This also allows China's MSI to be more competitive in shipping, shipbuilding, port
management, and crew manning on foreign ships.
A significant portion of China's MMF depends on earning profits from handling
maritime trade between the United States and Asia. The value to China of this trade can
288China's ports are illustrated on the left hand side of panels two and three. Robinson, 36.
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probably be leveraged in negotiations by the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission in revising
bilateral Sino-U.S. state maritime shipping policies.289 China's MMF currently enjoys more
favorable terms in U.S. ports than does the U.S. MMF in Chinese ports.290 U.S. shipping
companies such as Sea-Land have petitioned theFMC to rescind favorable exemptions given
to China's MMF until U.S. shipping companies receive similar terms in Chinese ports.
2. Impact on Strategic Resources and Foreign Trade
The level of China's access to and control over foreign strategic resources will
continue to increase. This is the result of aggressive Chinese foreign investment targeting
countries possessing large reserves of oil, gas, metals, and minerals. China's access to
strategic resources will also increase as China takes advantage of foreign privatization of
resource industries by nations in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. By 2010,
China's share ofworld energy resource consumption has been estimated to increase from its
current level of 9 percent to nearly 13 percent. 291
Increases in China's ability to access strategic resources will not necessarily increase
their prices. Resource prices are determined by a complex series of supply and demand
factors. Estimates based on current worldwide resource supply and production indicate
China's future demand has the probability of raising their prices: (1) low for energy
resources; (2) moderate to high for industrial resources; and (3) low to moderate for
289The 1988 Sino-U.S. maritime shipping agreement expired on 15 June 1998. Lloyd's ofLondon,
cited in "U.S. Lines Urge FMC to Hit Back at China Flag Ships," Cargonews Asia, 14 April 1998, Online.
Available HTTP:http://www.asial.com.sg/cgi-bin/ship/sp_dnews. 1 May 1998.
290The FMC recently granted China's COSCO and Sinotrans access to U.S. ports on 24 hours notice.
This represents an exception from the 30 days notification mandate for foreign carriers as stipulated in the




China's MSI expansion strategy increases levels of China's market share in
international trade relative to other nations. By 2010, China's share of world trade is
expected to increase from its current level of four percent to six percent. 292 Other estimates
indicate that by 201 5, China's share ofworld trade could exceed 1 3 percent.293 By 2020, the
World Bank estimates China could become the second largest importing and exporting
nation in the world.294 China's MSI expansion could decrease the ability of foreign MMF's
to earn profits if they continue to lose market share in handling international trade.
This strategy could impact the U.S. economy which also depends on foreign trade,
although the U.S. MMF is declining. This decline has resulted in less U.S. control over
maritime shipping of U.S. foreign trade. This expansion could also decrease the ability of
the United States to influence shipping linkages between it and the rest of the world. The
U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on foreign trade as pointed out by U.S. National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger who stated:
America's fifth strategic goal is to build a new, open trading system for the
21 st century. Our nation's economic well-being is tied to the rest of the
world. Eleven million Americans depend on exports for their jobs. We
should not fear the challenge of the global economy. Our workers and
businesses can compete just fine so long as the contest is open, the field
competitive and rules fair and enforced.295
292OECD, 12.
293These same estimates indicate Japan's share of world trade would be 10.6 percent. OECD, 67.
294The World Bank, September 1997, 103.
295Sandy Berger, "A Foreign Policy Agenda for the Second Term," Address to the Centerfor Strategic
and International Studies, Washington D.C., 27 March 1997.
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3. China's MSI and the Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian financial crisis offers China's MSI opportunities to gain influence in those
affected nations in the region. At first, the crisis resulted in a decrease in maritime shipping
demand for imports and exports in Asia. However, Asian countries such as Malaysia,
Thailand, and South Korea have announced economic recovery plans based on increasing
their exports to foreign nations, including China.
Concurrently, many Western trade companies have refused letters of credit from
Asian countries whose currencies have dropped in value compared to the U.S. Dollar. In
early 1998, Maersk and Sea-Land suspended one of their major shipping route services
between the United States and Asia that previously served Thailand, Japan, and Taiwan.296
However, the crises has caused a decrease in China's MSI profits from handling Intra-Asian
trade. As a result, China is increasing its exports to Europe and the United States, where
exports rose by 35 percent and 14 percent respectively during the first quarter of 1998,
compared to the same period in 1997.297
These developments offer opportunities for China's MSI because it is willing to
extend flexible shipping and trading arrangements with countries such as Indonesia in return
for industrial resources and food.298 China's MSI also may gain long-term market share on
international and regional shipping services vacated by other major shipping companies due
to the current short-term profitability outlook.
296Paul Richardson, "Asian Crisis Forces Route Cuts," Cargonews Asia, 23 February 1998.
297Henny Sender, "Against All Odds," FEER, 30 April 1998, 63.
298
"Crippling Shortages, Indonesia Looks to Bartering," Fairplay, 26 February 1998, 18.
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B. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
1. Expanding Security Role For China's Navy
Chinese maritime security policy makers have noted China's economic dependence
on the unhindered flow of trade and maritime shipping between China and foreign nations
in all regions of the world. SFT between China and Europe, the Middle East and Africa is
shipped along key SLOCs in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean,
Strait of Malacca, and the SCS. SFT between China and North and South America is
shipped along SLOCs that are relatively unhindered by chokepoints. Key SLOCs in these
ocean regions that are vital to China's SFT and MSI dependencies are depicted in Figure 20.
Figure 20. Key SLOCs in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and SCS
Protection of China's maritime shipping interests in the Western Pacific and
Southeast Asia would be enhanced through Sino-foreign naval cooperation and port access
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in foreign nations of the region. During February 1998, China's Defense Minister Chi
Haotian^visited, for the first time, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji. 299 These nations
are strategically located near alternate SLOCs that China and foreign MMFs would use ifkey
SLOCs in Southeast Asia were closed. China may perceive potential instability in the region
could result in an increase in piracy and terrorism against maritime shipping in the region.
While details of the bilateral discussions which took place during these visits are
unknown, Minister Haotian did discuss preparations for the PLAN port visits to Australia
and New Zealand which subsequently occurred between April-May 1998. Therefore, it
would be in China's strategic maritime security interests to develop friendly naval ties with
these nations. Figure 2 1 depicts key Southeast Asian SLOCs vital to China' s economy while
Figure 22 depicts alternate routes around Australia that shipping would divert.
Figure 21. Southeast Asian SLOCs J300 Figure 22. Alternate Shipping Routes 01
™Xinhua (Beijing), "Expanding Military Contacts Part of Diplomatic Strategy," FBIS, 20 February
1998.
™Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, (Washington D.C.: Institute For




Any potential disruption to China's MSI and SFT networks along key SLOCs would
have such a negative impact on China's economy that Beijing must consider these SLOCs
as vulnerable in strategic economic terms. Moreover, while China'sMMF is only marginally
affected by threats from foreign navies, piracy, and terrorism, Beijing can cite these threats
as a rationale to expand the PLAN'S presence in non-territorial waters.
At present, the PLAN does not have the capabilities to sustain a presence for
protecting its MMF in international waters beyond the SCS. It does have the capabilities to
conduct an occasional presence in international SLOCs. under the pretext of protecting its
MMF. However, the extent of future PLAN "blue-water" missions will be determined by
the success of China's naval modernization efforts to improve the capabilities of its ships.
The potential for the PLAN protecting its SFT and MSI is dependent on the following
six factors: (1) level of SFT and MSI cooperation; (2) perceptions of threats to China's
MMF; (3) capabilities of the PLAN; (4) foreign port access; (5) Evolution of Beijing's
maritime security strategy; and (6) hostile foreign political or military reactions to PLAN
presence. Analysis ofthese factors indicate that, if Chinese naval capabilities improve and
foreign port access is granted, there is a high probability that the PLAN will increase its
presence in the SCS, Strait of Malacca, and Western Pacific.
This high probability is the result ofChina' s dependence on importing bulk quantities
of foreign oil and industrial resources, as depicted in Figures 23 and 24, respectively.
Another factor is China's MSI's increased market share of containerized trades within and
without Asia, depicted in Figure 25. The probabilities are medium in the Indian Ocean and
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Figure 25. Major Container Shipping Routes in Asia, 1993 304
2. Foreign Port Access For China's Navy
China's political and military leaders have stated consistently that its military "will
not establish military alliances with any country, and it will not station its army abroad or
establish military bases abroad."305 However, this and other similar statements do not
preclude PLAN ships from "visiting" or "temporarily deploying" to foreign ports. Beijing's
active economic, political, and security engagement of foreign nations along the world's
304NDU, 66.
305
"Minister Speaks at Japanese Institute," Ta KungPao (Hong Kong), FBIS, 5 February 1998.
Minister Chi Haotian in "Speech Before the Japan Defense Research Institute," 4 February 1998. Minister
Chi Haotian is concurrently China's Vice-Chairman of the CMC and Minister of National Defense.
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littoral regions increases the potential of the PLAN'S future access to international ports.
If China's maritime security strategy evolves into allowing PLAN protection of
China' sMMF in international SLOCs, PLAN ships would require access to foreign ports for
repair, refueling, and replenishment. Based on levels ofSFT and bilateral MSI cooperation,
the probability for PLAN port access is high in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar,
Iran, Italy, Panama, and Australia.306 Based on levels ofSFT, exclusive ofMSI cooperation,
future opportunities for PLAN port access include Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, and South Africa. The probabilities of foreign port
access for the PLAN are depicted in Appendix B.
Part of China's overall strategy for increasing its naval presence in the Western
Pacific, Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf probably is to incrementally increase the
frequency of bilateral naval port visits and initiate small-scale SLOC protection exercises.
Foreign nations with weak navies would be motivated to cooperate with the PLAN to protect
mutual maritime trading and transportation interests. These motivations increase the
probability the PLAN would be allowed access to foreign ports in the Western Pacific, SCS,
Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.
3. Other Implications For the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard
Increases in SFT and bilateral Sino-foreign MSI cooperation decrease the chance of
success for enforcing maritime economic sanctions against China. Maritime sanctions
against China would affect negatively many nations because China'sMMF carries cargo that
306The PLAN deployments in the SCS during 1997 included port calls at the Thai naval base in
Sattahip and the Malaysian Naval base at Lumut, cited in Gary Kintworth, "The Chinese Navy: Developing
Blue-Water Experience," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, February-March 1998, 20.
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is often consigned to multiple foreign owners. Foreign nations dependent on China's MSI
and SFT for their economic stability are unlikely to extend their navies' support for a
coalition enforcing maritime sanctions against China. Expansion of SFT has decreased the
threat to China from sanctions; as one Chinese military officer noted:
Of all the potential economic threats, the one which China faces most
frequently is Western economic sanctions. To deal with economic sanctions
imposed by some Western countries, China will strengthen its economic
relations with all other countries in the world.307
Beijing perceives its support and ratification ofUNCLOS III enhances its ability to
protect China's MMF. Since the USN uses "Customary Law" as a rationale for its
international operations and Washington has not yet ratified UNCLOS III, Beijing perceives
the USN has a "weaker" legal basis for patrolling international SLOCs than the PLAN. The
presence of the PLAN on international SLOCs could pose security risks to non-Chinese
MMF shipping. These risks have implications that are illustrated by the comments of a
Chinese security official who stated:
Provisions of UNCLOS provide justification for the PLAN to intercept,
board, and inspect merchant shipping in international waters."308 Chinese
Naval ships and aircraft will acquire corresponding powers according to the
treaty . . . [and] will give warships and other ships innocent passage rights to
the territorial seas ofother countries' coastlines. Once the treaty takes effect,
as the PLA Navy operations in sea areas expand and enforcement missions
increase, opportunities for engagement or other international dealings by our
naval warships with foreign commercial and military ships will grow ever
more frequent. The navy is the only service arm that can engage in long-term
actions outside our territory, with international law also granting our navy
various rights and interests such as sailing the high seas and passage through
307Xu Xiaojun, 35.
308Liu Zhenhuan, "Impact ofUN Law of the Sea On China's Maritime Rights and Interests, Part III,"
National Defense, FBIS, 15 November 1996.
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concerned international straits. 309
Beijing's desire to protect China'sMMF in international waters can be viewed as not
necessarily threatening to U.S. national security interests. Rather, they can be considered as
opportunities for bilateral naval cooperation between the USN or U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
and the PLAN. During ceremonies welcoming three PLAN ships in San Diego, Vice-
Admiral Brent Bennitt commented "Although our two navies have different cultural
backgrounds, they both have patriotic sailors dedicated to protecting the Pacific sea lanes that
carry more than $56 billion worth of bilateral trade."310
Expansion of the PLAN'S operations in international waters offers opportunities for
the USN and USCG to cooperate with China in protecting mutual maritime shipping and
trade interests. In 1997, Admiral Prueher, USCINCPAC, indicated the potential for future
Sino-U.S. maritime security cooperation: "Because the U.S. and China share many common
interest, we are attempting to engage China in a military-to-military relationship."31 ' Such
cooperation would be a part of future bilateral and multilateral naval cooperation as
envisioned by Admiral Jay L. Johnson, CNO, who stated:
In the post-Cold War world, nations must cooperate as never before to face
the challenges -and threats-ofthe century to come. Navies must innovate and
collaborate to ride out the changes in global security and commerce We
are being asked to innovate ... to attempt new, untested missions. We now
confront spreading threats ofterrorism, international drug trafficking ... [he
309Liu Zhenhuan, "On the UN Law of the Sea Treaty and Thoughts on China's New-Age Coastal
Defense Establishment," China Military Science, FBIS, 20 May 1997, 93-99.
310Guangren Bao and David Devoss, "Chinese Warships Sail Into San Diego," Asia Times, 24 March
1997.
31
'Quote from text of Adm. Prueher's testimony before the House National Security Affairs
Committee, 6 March 1997, cited in George C. Wilson, "Prueher: China Presents No Imminent Threat,"
Navy Times, 24 March 1997, 17.
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advocated] more interaction among navies to keep them as vital, visible, and
relevant in peacetime as in war. Joint efforts are possible in areas ranging
form law enforcement at sea, to maintain safe waters for commerce, to
disaster relief and humanitarian aid. 312
On 19 January 1998 in Beijing, the United States and China signed a "Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement," which provides a basis for future bilateral naval
cooperation.313 The United States may be able to improve USN/USCG-PLAN relations and
gain the support of China for proposals for bilateral and multilateral naval cooperation
through formal regional security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). 314 Examples of future
cooperation between the USN/USCG and PLAN include bilateral port visits and naval
exercises for search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and anti-piracy patrols to protect
merchant shipping.
An emphasis on protection of merchant shipping as a basis for USN/USCG-PLAN
cooperation is a rationale that incorporates three important considerations. One
consideration is that this rationale removes the political and security stigmas attached to
robust hostility-based joint and combined scenarios. Such scenarios include power-
projection, territorial seizure, and sea-denial commonly emphasized in joint and combined
exercises in the region.
312Celeste Katz, "Navy Leader Touts Alliance Among World's Navies," Providence Journal-Bulletin,
4 November 1997, B3.
3I3The agreement was signed by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and PRC Defense Minister
Chi Haotian in Beijing. Bill Gertz, "China to Halt Missile Sales to Iran," The Washington Times, 20
January 1998, 1.
314See Brian L. Job, "Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Achieving the Right Balance in Asia Pacific
Security Relations," Paper presented at the 7997 Pacific Symposium, Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific
Region: Cooperation and Conflict, 28-29 April 1997.
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Another consideration is that this rationale would be attractive to China because the
USN and USCG can offer the PLAN assistance for improving its capabilities for protecting
China's MSI. 315 This assistance could include the USN/USCG providing the PLAN with
familiarization training in ship-handling, communications, underway replenishment,
helicopter flight operations, maritime law enforcement, and Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure
(VBSS) to combat piracy and smuggling. Such scenarios could be executed under
USCINCPAC ' s Joint-Combined Exchange Training (JCET) orUSCINCPACFLT' s bilateral
naval training programs between the U.S. and foreign nations in the Asia-Pacific region.
Still another consideration is based on the need for multilateral naval cooperation in
protecting international MSI interests. These interests, shared by many nations, is a basis for
such cooperation as Daniel Y. Coulter explains:
The internationalization ofthe shipping industry poses a quandary for navies,
since they represent a national policy instrument in a world where states are
becoming [economically] globalized. Hence, navies with their inherent
national orientation must work together in scenarios that have adverse impact
far beyond their territorial waters. Future disruptions to shipping and trade
are certain to have international consequences and, therefore, are much more
likely to demand multinational naval cooperation.316
A key precursor to identifying whether China will commit the PLAN to protect
China's MSI in international waters would be significant increases in funding for the PLAN
beyond the present incremental modernization. China's perceptions of threats to its MSI
partly determines funding for PLAN expansion. Regarding China's future military budget
315
In 1983, Jan S. Breemer discussed USN-PLAN cooperation based on a rationale of countering
naval threats to Sino-U.S. maritime shipping posed by the Soviet Union. See Jan S. Breemer, "U.S.-
Chinese Cooperation: The Naval Dimension", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1983, 71-77.
3l6Author's interview with Mr. Coulter, 5 May 1998.
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expenditures, Defense Minister General Chi Haotian, stated: "In the future, China's national
defense expenditures will not have a large-scale and substantive increase as long as no
condition emerges that seriously threatens China's state sovereignty and safety."317
3,7
"China: Minister Speaks at Japanese Institute," Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), FBIS, 5 February 1998.
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APPENDIX A. CHINA'S REGIONAL MARITIME SHIPPING NETWORKS38
Asia-Oceania- North America
Asia-Africa- North America (East Coast) -
South America Intra-Africa (West Coast) Asia-Europe Europe Intra-Asia
China: Shanghai, South Africa: China: Shanghai, China: Qingdao, U.S.: Baltimore, China: Shanghai,
Dalian, Jiangjian, Capetown, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Charleston, New Tianjin, Hong
Hong Kong, Durban, Xiamen, Qingdao Hong Kong York, Norfolk Kong, Xiamen
S. Africa: Durban, Ghana: Australia: Sydney Belgium: Italy: Genoa, Malaysia:
Cape Town, Port Tema Brisbane, Antwerp Naples Penang, Klang
Elizabeth Melbourne
Kenya: Ivory Coast: Fiji: Germany: France: Indonesia: Jakarta,
Mombasa Abidja Suva Bermerhaven Le Havre Surabaya
Ivory Coast: Nigeria: Japan: Yokohama France: Germany: Kampuchea:
Abidjan Lagos Kobe, Nagoya Le Havre Bremerhaven Kompong Son




Argentina: Congo: Philippines: Netherlands: Cyprus: Vietnam: Ho Chi
Buenos Aires Matadi Manila Rotterdam Limassol Minh City
Panama S. Korea: Pusan Singapore Israel: Haifa Singapore
Brazil: Thailand: Thailand: Spain: Barcelona, Thailand:
Santos, Vitori Laem Chabang Bangkok Valencia Bangkok
Uruguay: U.S.: Seattle,Long U.K.: U.K.: Sri Lanka:
Montevideo Beach, Oakland Felixstowe Felixstowe Columbo





318,COSCO Homepage. Online. Available HTTP:http://www.coscon.com/shipl/se. 17 May 1998.
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Vietnam Poor Poor Fair No Poor
Cambodia Fair Good Good No Good
Thailand Good Excellent Excellent Yes Excellent
Philippines Poor Good Good Yes Good
Malaysia Fair Good Excellent Yes Good
Singapore Good Good Excellent No Excellent
Brunei Fair Good Excellent No Good
Indonesia Fair Fair Good Yes Good
Myanmar Excellent Excellent Excellent No Excellent
Bangladesh Good Good Fair Yes Good
Sri Lanka Fair Good Good Yes Good
India Poor Poor Fair No Poor
Pakistan Good Excellent Good Yes Excellent
Iran Excellent Excellent Excellent No Excellent
Iraq Good Good Fair No Good
UAE Fair Good Excellent No Good
Kuwait Fair Good Good No Good
Saudi Arabia Fair Excellent Excellent No Excellent
Kenya Fair Good Good No Good
South Africa Fair Excellent Excellent No Excellent
Russia Good Good Excellent Yes Excellent
Australia Good Excellent Excellent Yes Excellent
New Zealand Good Good Excellent Yes Excellent
Fiji Fair Good Good No Good
Latin America Fair Excellent Excellent Yes Good
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